Dynamic Reasoning Systems by Schwartz, Daniel G.
0Dynamic Reasoning Systems
DANIEL G. SCHWARTZ, Florida State University
A dynamic reasoning system (DRS) is an adaptation of a conventional formal logical system that explicitly
portrays reasoning as a temporal activity, with each extralogical input to the system and each inference rule
application being viewed as occurring at a distinct time step. Every DRS incorporates some well-defined
logic together with a controller that serves to guide the reasoning process in response to user inputs. Logics
are generic, whereas controllers are application-specific. Every controller does, nonetheless, provide an al-
gorithm for nonmonotonic belief revision. The general notion of a DRS comprises a framework within which
one can formulate the logic and algorithms for a given application and prove that the algorithms are correct,
i.e., that they serve to (i) derive all salient information and (ii) preserve the consistency of the belief set. This
paper illustrates the idea with ordinary first-order predicate calculus, suitably modified for the present pur-
pose, and two examples. The latter example revisits some classic nonmonotonic reasoning puzzles (Opus the
Penguin, Nixon Diamond) and shows how these can be resolved in the context of a DRS, using an expanded
version of first-order logic that incorporates typed predicate symbols. All concepts are rigorously defined and
effectively computable, thereby providing the foundation for a future software implementation.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The notion of a dynamic reasoning system (DRS) was introduced in [27] for purposes of
formulating reasoning involving a logic of ‘qualified syllogisms’. The idea arose in an
effort to devise some rules for evidence combination. The logic under study included a
multivalent semantics where propositions P were assigned a probabilistic ‘likelihood
value’ l(P ) in the interval [0, 1], so that the likelihood value plays the role of a surrogate
truth value. The situation being modeled is where, based on some evidence, P is as-
signed a likelihood value l1, and then later, based on other evidence, is assigned a value
l2, and it subsequently is desired to combine these values based on some rule into a re-
sulting value l3. This type of reasoning cannot be represented in a conventional formal
logical system with the usual Tarski semantics, since such systems do not allow that
a proposition may have more than one truth value; otherwise the semantics would not
be mathematically well-defined. Thus the idea arose to speak more explicitly about dif-
ferent occurrences of the propositions P where the occurrences are separated in time.
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In this manner one can construct a well-defined semantics by mapping the different
time-stamped occurrences of P to different likelihood/truth values.
In turn, this led to viewing a ‘derivation path’ as it evolves over time as representing
the knowledge base, or belief set, of a reasoning agent that is progressively building
and modifying its knowledge/beliefs through ongoing interaction with its environment
(including inputs from human users or other agents). It also presented a framework
within which one can formulate a Doyle-like procedure for nonmonotonic ‘reason main-
tenance’ [5; 33]. Briefly, if the knowledge base harbors inconsistencies due to contradic-
tory inputs from the environment, then in time a contradiction may appear in the rea-
soning path (knowledge base, belief set), triggering a back-tracking procedure aimed at
uncovering the ‘culprit’ propositions that gave rise to the contradiction and disabling
(disbelieving) one or more of them so as to remove the inconsistency.
Reasoning is nonmonotonic when the discovery and introduction of new information
causes one to retract previously held assumptions or conclusions. This is to be con-
trasted with classical formal logical systems, which are monotonic in that the intro-
duction of new information (nonlogical axioms) always increases the collection of con-
clusions (theorems). [27] contains an extensive bibliography and survey of the works
related to nonmonotonic reasoning as of 1997. In particular, this includes a discussion
of (i) the classic paper by McCarthy and Hayes [20] defining the ‘frame problem’ and
describing the ‘situation calculus’, (ii) Doyle’ s ‘truth maintenance system’ [5] and sub-
sequent ‘reason maintenance system’ [33], (iii) McCarthy’s ‘circumscription’ [19], (iv)
Reiter’s ‘default logic’ [26], and (v) McDermott and Doyle’s ‘nonmonotonic logic’ [21].
With regard to temporal aspects, there also are discussed works by Shoham and Perlis.
[30; 31] explores the idea of making time an explicit feature of the logical formalism for
reasoning ‘about’ change, and [32] describes a vision of ‘agent-oriented programming’
that is along the same lines of the present DRS, portraying reasoning itself as a tempo-
ral activity. In [6; 7; 8; 9; 23; 25] Perlis and his students introduce and study the notion
of ‘step logic’, which studies reasoning as ‘situated’ in time, and in this respect also
has elements in common with the notion of a DRS. Additionally mentioned but not
elaborated upon in [27] is the so-called AGM framework [1; 11; 12], named after its
originators. Nonmonotonic reasoning and belief revision are related in that the former
may be viewed as a variety of the latter.
These cited works are nowadays regarded as the classic approaches to nonmono-
tonic reasoning and belief revision. Since 1997 the AGM approach has risen in promi-
nence, due in large part to the publication [15], which builds upon and substantially
advances the AGM framework. AGM defines a belief set as a collection of propositions
that is closed with respect to the classical consequence operator, and operations of ‘con-
traction’, ‘expansion’ and ‘revision’ are defined on belief sets. [15] made the important
observation that a belief set can conveniently be represented as the consequential clo-
sure of a finite ‘belief base’, and these same AGM operations can be defined in terms
of operations performed on belief bases. Since that publication, AGM has enjoyed a
steadily growing population of adherents. A recent publication [10] overviews the first
25 years of research in this area.
Another research thread that has risen to prominence is the logic-programming ap-
proach to nonmonotonic reasoning known as Answer Set Prolog (AnsProlog). A major
work on AnsProlog is the treatise [3]. This line of research suggests that an effective
approach to nonmonotonic reasoning can be formulated in an extension of the well-
known Prolog programming language. Interest in this topic has spawned a series of
eleven conferences on Logic Programming and Nonmonotonic Reasoning, the most re-
cent of which is [4].
The DRS framework discussed in the present work has elements in common with
both AGM and AnsProlog, but also differs from these in several respects. Most impor-
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tantly, the present focus is on the creation of computational algorithms that are suf-
ficiently articulated that they can effectively be implemented in software and thereby
lead to concrete applications. This element is still lacking in AGM, despite Hansson’s
contribution regarding finite belief bases. The AGM operations continue to be given
only as set-theoretic abstractions and have not yet been translated into computable al-
gorithms. Regarding AnsProlog, this research thread holds promise of a new extension
of Prolog, but siimliarly with AGM the necessary algorithms have yet to be formulated.
A way in which the present approach varies from the original AGM approach, but
happens to agree with the views expressed by [15] (cf. pp. 15-16), in that it dispenses
with two of the original ’rationality postulates’, namely, the requirements that the
underlying belief set be at all times (i) consistent, and (ii) closed with respect to logical
entailment. The latter is sometimes called the ‘omniscience’ postulate, inasmuch as
the modeled agent is thus characterized as knowing all possible logical consequences
of its beliefs.
These postulates are intuitively appealing, but they have the drawback that they
lead to infinitary systems and thus cannot be directly implemented on a finite com-
puter. To wit, the logical consequences of even a fairly simple set of beliefs will be infi-
nite in number; and assurance of consistency effectively requires omniscience since one
must know whether the logical consequences of the given beliefs include any contradic-
tions. Dropping these postulates does have anthropomorphic rationale, however, since
humans themselves cannot be omniscient in the sense described, and, because of this,
often harbor inconsistent beliefs without being aware of it. Thus it is not unreason-
able that our agent-oriented reasoning models should have these same characteristics.
Similar remarks may be found in the cited pages of [15].
The present work differs from the AGM approach in several other respects. First,
what is here taken as a ‘belief set’ is neither a belief set in the sense of AGM and
Hansson nor a Hansson-style belief base. Rather it consists of the set of statements
that have been input by an external agent as of some time t, together with the conse-
quences of those statements that have been derived in accordance with the algorithms
provided in a given ’controller’. Second, by labeling the statements with the time step
when they are entered into the belief set (either by an external agent or derived by
means of an inference rule), one can use the labels as a basis for defining the asso-
ciated algorithms. Third, whereas Ga¨rdenfors, Hansson, and virtually all others that
have worked with the AGM framework, have confined their language to be only propo-
sitional, the present work takes the next step to full first-order predicate logic. This is
significant inasmuch as the consistency of a finite set of propositions with respect to the
classical consequence operation can be determined by truth-table methods, whereas
the consistency of a finite set of statements in first-order predicate logic is undecidable
(the famous result due to Go¨del). For this reason the present work develops a well-
defined semantics for the chosen logic and establishes a soundness theorem, which in
turn can be used to establish consistency. Last, the present use of a controller is itself
new, and leads to a new efficacy for applications.
The notion a controller was not present in the previous work [27]. Its introduction
here thus fills an important gap in that treatment. The original conception of a DRS
provided a framework for modeling the reasoning processes of an artificial agent to
the extent that those processes follow a well-defined logic, but it offered no mechanism
for deciding what inference rules to apply at any given time. What was missing was
a means to provide the agent with a sense of purpose, i.e., mechanisms for pursuing
goals. This deficiency is remedied in the present treatment. The controller responds
to inputs from the agent’s environment, expressed as propositions in the agent’s lan-
guage. Inputs are classified as being of various ‘types’, and, depending on the input
type, a reasoning algorithm is applied. Some of these algorithms may cause new propo-
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sitions to be entered into the belief set, which in turn may invoke other algorithms.
These algorithms thus embody the agent’s purpose and are domain-specific, tailored
to a particular application. But in general their role is to ensure that (i) all salient
propositions are derived and entered into to the belief set, and (ii) the belief set re-
mains consistent. The latter is achieved by invoking a Doyle-like reason maintenance
algorithm whenever a contradiction, i.e., a proposition of the form P ∧ ¬P , is entered
into the belief set.
This work accordingly represents a rethinking, refinement, and extension of the ear-
lier work, aimed at (1) providing mathematical clarity to some relevant concepts that
previously were not explicitly defined, (ii) introducing the notion of a controller and
spelling out its properties, and (iii) illustrating these ideas with a small collection of
example applications. The present effort may be viewed as laying the groundwork for a
future project to produce a software implementation of the DRS framework, this being
a domain-independent software framework into which can be plugged domain-specific
modules as required for any given application. Note that the present mathematical
work is a necessary prerequisite for the software implementation inasmuch as this
provides the needed formal basis for an unambiguous set of requirements specifica-
tions.
The following Section 2 provides a fully detailed definition of the notion of a DRS.
Section 3 presents the syntax and semantics for first-order predicate logic, suitably
adapted for the present purpose, and proves a series of needed results including a
Soundness Theorem. This section also introduces some derived inference rules for use
in the ensuing example applications. Section 4 illustrates the core ideas in an appli-
cation to a simple document classification system. Section 5 extends this to an ap-
plication for multiple-inheritance reasoning, a form of default reasoning underlying
frame-based expert systems. This provides new resolutions for some well-known puz-
zles from the literature on nonmonotonic reasoning. Section 6 consists of concluding
remarks.
Regarding the examples, it may be noted that a Subsumption inference rule plays
a central role, giving the present work elements in common also with the work on
Description Logic (DL), c.f. [2]. The DL notion of a ‘role’ is not employed here, however,
inasmuch as the concept of an object having certain properties is modeled in Section 5
through the use of typed predicate symbols.
An earlier, condensed, version of Sections 2, 3 and 4 has been published as [28].
The works [38; 40] contain precursors to the present notion of a DRS controller, and
a DRS application using a ‘logic of belief and trust’ has been described in [37; 39; 40;
41]. While the present work employs classical first-order predicate calculus, the DRS
framework can accommodate any logic for which the exists a well-defined syntax and
semantics.
All proofs of propositions and theorems have been placed in the electronic appendix.
2. DYNAMIC REASONING SYSTEMS
A dynamic reasoning system (DRS) comprises a model of an artificial agent’s reasoning
processes to the extent that those processes adhere to the principles of some well-
defined logic. Formally it is comprised of a ‘path logic’, which provides all the elements
necessary for reasoning, and a ‘controller’, which guides the reasoning process.
For contrast, and by way of introductory overview, the basic structure of a classical
formal logic system is portrayed in Figure 2.1 and that of a DRS in Figure 2.2. A clas-
sical system is defined by providing a language consisting of a set of propositions, se-
lecting certain propositions to serve as axioms, and specifying a set of inference rules
saying how, from certain premises one can derive certain conclusions. The theorems
then amount to all the propositions that can be derived from the axioms by means of
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Propositions
Axioms Theorems Inference
Rules
Figure 2.1. Classical formal logical system.
Propositions
Axiom Schemas
Derivation Path
Schema
Instantiation Rules Inference
Rules
Figure 2.2. Dynamic reasoning system.
the rules. Such systems are monotonic in that adding new axioms always serves to in-
crease the set of theorems. Axioms are of two kinds: logical and extralogical (or proper,
or nonlogical). The logical axioms together with the inference rules comprise the ‘logic’.
The extralogical axioms comprise information about the application domain. A DRS be-
gins similarly with specifying a language consisting of a set of propositions. But here
the ‘logic’ is given in terms of a set of axioms schemas, some inference rules as above,
and some rules for instantiating the schemas. The indicated derivation path serves
as the belief set. Logical axioms may be entered into the derivation path by applying
instantiation rules. Extralogical axioms are entered from an external source (human
user, another agent, a mechanical sensor, etc.). Thus the derivation path evolves over
time, with propositions being entered into the path either as extralogical axioms or
derived by means of inference rules in accordance with the algorithms provided in the
controller. Whenever a new proposition is entered into the path it is marked as ‘be-
lieved’. In the event that a contradiction arises in the derivation path, a nonmonotonic
belief revision process is invoked which leads to certain previously believed proposi-
tions becoming disbelieved, thereby removing the contradiction. The full details for
the two components of a DRS are given in Sections 2.1 and 2.2.
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2.1. Path Logic
A path logic consists of a language, axiom schemas, inference rules, and a derivation
path, as follows.
Language: Here denoted L, this consists of all expressions (or formulas) that can be
generated from a given set σ of symbols in accordance with a collection of production
rules (or an inductive definition, or some similar manner of definition). As symbols
typically are of different types (e.g., individual variables, constants, predicate symbols,
etc.) it is assumed that there is an unlimited supply (uncountably many if necessary) of
each type. Moreover, as is customary, some symbols will be logical symbols (e.g., logical
connectives, quantifiers, and individual variables), and some will be extralogical sym-
bols (e.g., individual constants and predicate symbols). It is assumed that L contains at
least the logical connectives for expressing negation and conjunction, herein denoted ¬
and ∧, or a means for defining these connectives in terms of the given connectives. For
example, in the following we take ¬ and→ as given and use the standard definition of
∧ in terms of these.
Axiom Schemas: Expressed in some meta notation, these describe the expressions
of L that are to serve as logical axioms.
Inference Rules: These must include one or more rules that enable instantiation
of the axiom schemas. All other inference rules will be of the usual kind, i.e., stating
that, from expressions having certain forms (premise expressions), one may infer an
expression of some other form (a conclusion expression). Of the latter, two kinds are
allowed: logical rules, which are considered to be part of the underlying logic, and
extralogical rules, which are associated with the intended application. Note that logical
axioms are expressions that are derived by applying the axiom schema instantiation
rules. Inference rules may be viewed formally as mappings from L into itself.
The rule set may include derived rules that simplify deductions by encapsulating
frequently used argument patterns. Rules derived using only logical axioms and logical
rules will also be logical rules, and derived rules whose derivations employ extralogical
rules will be additional extralogical rules.
Derivation Paths: These consist of a sequences of pairs (L0, B0), (L1, B1), . . ., where
Lt is the sublanguage of L that is in use at time t, and Bt is the belief set in effect at
time t. Such a sequence is generated as follows. Since languages are determined by
the symbols they employ, it is useful to speak more directly in terms of the set σt
comprising the symbols that are in use at time t and then let Lt be the sublanguage of
L that is based on the symbols in σt. With this in mind, let σ0 be the logical symbols of
L, so that L0 is the minimal language employing only logical symbols, and let B0 = ∅.
Then, given (Lt, Bt), the pair (Lt+1, Bt+1) is formed in one of the following ways:
(1) σt+1 = σt (so that Lt+1 = Lt) and Bt+1 is obtained from Bt by adding an expres-
sion that is derived by application of an inference rule that instantiates an axiom
schema,
(2) σt+1 = σt and Bt+1 is obtained from Bt by adding an expression that is derived
from expressions appearing earlier in the path by application of an inference rule
of the kind that infers a conclusion from some premises,
(3) σt+1 = σt and an expression employing these symbols is added to Bt to form Bt+1,
(4) some new extralogical symbols are added to σt to form σt+1, and an expression
employing the new symbols is added to Bt to form Bt+1,
(5) σt+1 = σt and Bt+1 is obtained from Bt by applying a belief revision algorithm as
described in the following.
Note that the use of axiom schemas together with schema instantiation rules here
replaces the customary approach of defining logical axioms as all formulas having the
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‘forms’ described by the schemas and then including these axioms among the set of
‘theorems’. The reason for adopting this alternative approach is to ensure that the DRS
formalism is finitary, and hence, machine implementable—it is not possible to repre-
sent an infinite set of axioms (or theorems) on a computer. That the two approaches
are equivalent should be obvious. Expressions entered into the belief set in accordance
with either (3) or (4) will be extralogical axioms. A DRS can generate any number of
different derivation paths, depending on the extralogical axioms that are input and
the inference rules that are applied.
Whenever an expression is entered into the belief set it is assigned a label comprised
of:
(1) A time stamp, this being the value of the subscript t + 1 on the set Bt+1 formed
by entering the expression into the belief set in accordance with any of the above
items (1) through (4). The time stamp effectively serves as an index indicating the
expression’s position in the belief set.
(2) A from-list, indicating how the expression came to be entered into the belief set. In
case the expression is entered in accordance with the above item (1), i.e., using a
schema instantiation rule, this list consists of the name (or other identifier) of the
schema and the name (or other identifier) of the inference rule if the system has
more than one such rule. In case the expression is entered in accordance with above
item (2), the list consists of the indexes (time stamps) of the premise expressions
and the name (or other identifier) of the inference rule. In case the expression is
entered in accordance with either of items (3) or (4), i.e., is a extralogical axiom, the
list will consist of some code indicating this (e.g., es standing for ‘external source’)
possibly together with some identifier or other information regarding the source.
(3) A to-list, being a list of indexes of all expressions that have been entered into the be-
lief set as a result of rule applications involving the given expression as a premise.
Thus to-lists may be updated at any future time.
(4) A status indicator having the value bel or disbel according as the proposition as-
serted by the expression currently is believed or disbelieved. The primary signifi-
cance of this status is that only expressions that are believed can serve as premises
in inference rule applications. Whenever an expression is first entered into the be-
lief set, it is assigned status bel. This value may then be changed during belief
revision at a later time. When an expression’s status is changed from bel to disbel
it is said to have been retracted.
(5) An epistemic entrenchment factor, this being a numerical value indicating the
strength with which the proposition asserted by the expression is held. This ter-
minology is adopted in recognition of the work by Ga¨rdenfors, who initiated this
concept [11; 12], and is used here for essentially the same purpose, namely, to assist
when making decisions regarding belief retractions. Depending on the application,
however, this value might alternatively be interpreted as a degree of belief, as a
certainty factor, as a degree of importance, or some other type of value to be used
for this purpose.1 In the present treatment, epistemic entrenchment values are as-
signed only to axioms. No provision for propagating these factors to expressions
derived via rule inferences is provided, although this would be a natural extension
of the present treatment. It is agreed that logical axioms always receive the highest
possible epistemic entrenchment value, whatever scale or range may be employed.
1Ga¨rdenfors asserts that the notion of a degree of epistemic entrenchment is distinct from that of a degree
(or probability) of belief. ‘This degree [of entrenchment] is not determined by how probable a belief is judged
to be but rather by how important the belief is to inquiry and deliberation.’ [11], p. 17. Nonetheless, degrees
of belief could be used as a basis for managing belief retraction if this were deemed appropriate for a given
application.
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(6) A knowledge category specification, having one of the values a priori, a posteriori,
analytic, and synthetic. These terms are employed in recognition of the philosoph-
ical tradition initiated by Kant [18]. Logical axioms are designated as a priori;
extralogical axioms are designated as a posteriori; expressions whose derivations
employ only logical axioms and logical inference rules are designated as analytic;
and expressions whose derivations employ any extralogical axioms or extralogical
rules are designated as synthetic. The latter is motivated by the intuition that an
ability to apply inference rules and thereby carry out logical derivations is itself a
priori knowledge, so that, even if the premises in a rule application are all a poste-
riori and/or the rule itself is extralogical, the rule application entails a combination
of a priori and a posteriori knowledge, and the conclusion of the application thus
qualifies as synthetic (rather than a posteriori) under most philosophical interpre-
tations of this term.
Thus when an expression P is entered into the belief set, it is more exactly entered as
an expression-label pair (P, λ), where λ is the label. A DRS’s language, axiom schemas,
and inference rules comprise a logic in the usual sense. It is required that this logic be
consistent, i.e., for no expression P is it possible to derive both P and ¬P . The belief
set may become inconsistent, nonetheless, through the introduction of contradictory
extralogical axioms.
In what follows, only expressions representing a posteriori and synthetic knowledge
may be retracted; expressions of a priori knowledge are taken as being held unequiv-
ocally. Thus the term ‘a priori knowledge’ is taken as synonymous with ‘belief held
unequivocally’, and ‘a posteriori knowledge’ is interpreted as ‘belief possibly held only
tentatively’ (some a posteriori beliefs may be held unequivocally). Thus the distinction
between knowledge and belief is somewhat blurred, and what is referred to as a ‘be-
lief set’ might alternatively be called a ‘knowledge base’, as is often the practice in AI
systems.
2.2. Controller
A controller effectively determines the modeled agent’s purpose or goals by managing
the DRS’s interaction with its environment and guiding the reasoning process. With
regard to the latter, the objectives typically include (i) deriving all expressions salient
to the given application and entering these into the belief set, and (ii) ensuring that
the belief set remains consistent. To these ends, the business of the controller amounts
to performing the following operations.
(1) Receiving input from its environment, e.g., human users, sensors, or other artificial
agents, expressing this input as expressions in the given language L, and entering
these expressions into the belief set in the manner described above (derivation path
items (3) and (4)). During this operation, new symbols are appropriated as needed
to express concepts not already represented in the current Lt.
(2) Applying inference rules in accordance with some extralogical objective (some plan,
purpose, or goal) and entering the derived conclusions into the belief set in the
manner described above (derivation path items (1) and (2)).
(3) Performing any actions that may be prescribed as a result of the above reason-
ing process, e.g., moving a robotic arm, returning a response to a human user, or
sending a message to another artificial agent.
(4) Whenever necessary, applying a ‘dialectical belief revision’ algorithm for contradic-
tion resolution in the manner described below.
(5) Applying any other belief revision algorithm as may be prescribed by the context
of a particular application.
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In some systems, the above may include other types of belief revision operations, but
such will not be considered in the present work.
A contradiction is an expression of the form P ∧ ¬P . Sometimes it is convenient to
represent the general notion of contradiction by the falsum symbol, ⊥. Contradiction
resolution is triggered whenever a contradiction or a designated equivalent expression
is entered into the belief set. We may assume that this only occurs as the result of an
inference rule application, since it obviously would make no sense to enter a contradic-
tion directly as an extralogical axiom. The contradiction resolution algorithm entails
three steps:
(1) Starting with the from-list in the label on the contradictory expression, backtrack
through the belief set following from-lists until one identifies all extralogical ax-
ioms that were involved in the contradiction’s derivation. Note that such extralog-
ical axioms must exist, since, by the consistency of the logic, the contradiction can-
not constitute analytical knowledge, and hence must be synthetic.
(2) Change the belief status of one or more of these extralogical axioms, as many as
necessary to invalidate the derivation of the given contradiction. The decision as
to which axioms to retract may be dictated, or at least guided by, the epistemic en-
trenchment values. In effect, those expressions with the lower values would be pre-
ferred for retraction. In some systems, this retraction process may be automated,
and in others it may be human assisted.
(3) Forward chain through to-lists starting with the extralogical axiom(s) just re-
tracted, and retract all expressions whose derivations were dependent on those ax-
ioms. These retracted expressions should include the contradiction that triggered
this round of belief revision (otherwise the correct extralogical axioms were not
retracted).
This belief revision algorithm is reminiscent of Hegel’s ‘dialectic’, described as a pro-
cess of ‘negation of the negation’ [17]. In that treatment, the latter (first occurring)
negation is a perceived internal conflict (here a contradiction), and the former (second
occurring) one is an act of transcendence aimed at resolving the conflict (here remov-
ing the contradiction). In recognition of Hegel, the belief revision/retraction process
formalized in the above algorithm will be called Dialectical Belief Revision.
2.3. General Remarks
Specifying a DRS requires specifying a path logic and a controller. A path logic is
specified by providing (i) a language L, (ii) a set of axiom schemas, and (iii) a set of
inference rules. A controller is specified by providing (i) the types of expressions that
the DRS can receive as inputs from external sources, with each such type typically
being described as expressions having a certain form, and (ii) for each such input type,
an algorithm that is to be executed when the DRS receives an input of that type. Such
an algorithm typically involves applying inference rules, thereby deriving new formu-
las to be entered into the belief set, and it might specify other actions as well, such as
moving a robotic arm, writing some information to a file, or returning a response to the
user. All controllers are assumed to include a mechanism for dialectical belief revision
as described above.
Thus defined a DRS may be viewed as representing the ‘mind’ of an intelligent agent,
where this includes both the agent’s reasoning processes and its memory. At any time
t, the belief set Bt represents the agent’s conscious awareness as of that time. Since the
extralogical axioms can entail inconsistencies, this captures the fact that an agent can
‘harbor’ inconsistencies without being aware of this. The presence of inconsistencies
only becomes evident to the agent when they lead to a contradictory expression being
explicitly entered into the belief set, in effect, making the agent consciously aware of a
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contradiction that was implicit in its beliefs. This then triggers a belief revision process
aimed at removing the inconsistency that gave rise to the contradiction.
Depending on the application, the controller may be programmed to carry out axiom
schema instantiations and perform derivations based on logical axioms. Such might
be the case, for example, if the logical rules were to include a ‘resolution rule’ and the
controller incorporated a Prolog-like theorem prover. In many applications, however,
it may be more appropriate to base the controller on a few suitably chosen derived
rules. The objective in this would be to simplify the controller’s design by encapsulat-
ing frequently used argument patterns. In such cases, the use of axiom schemas and
logical inference rules is implicit, but no logical axioms per se need be entered into the
derivation path. Accordingly, all members of the belief set will be either a posteriori or
synthetic and thus subject to belief revision. This is illustrated in the examples that
follow.
3. FIRST-ORDER LOGIC
3.1. Formalism
This section presents classical first-order logic (FOL) in a form suitable for incor-
poration into a DRS. The treatment follows [14]. As symbols for the language L
we shall have: individual variables, x1,x2, . . ., denoted generically by x, y, z, etc.;
individual constants, a1,a2, . . ., denoted generically by a, b, c, etc.; predicate sym-
bols, infinitely many for each arity (where arity is indicated by superscripts),
A11,A
1
2, . . . ;A
2
1,A
2
2, . . . ; . . ., denoted generically by α, β, γ, etc.; punctuation marks,
namely, the comma and left and right parentheses; the logical connectives ¬ and →;
the (universal) quantifier symbol, ∀; and the falsum symbol, ⊥.2
Here the logical symbols will be the individual variables, punctuation marks, logical
connectives, quantifier symbol, and falsum symbol. The extralogical symbols will be
the individual constants and the predicate symbols. Thus, as discussed in Section 2.1,
the sublanguages Lt of L will differ only in their choice of individual constants and
predicate symbols.
Given a sublanguage L of L, the terms of L will be the individual variables and the
individual contants of L. The atomic formulas of L will be the falsum symbol and all
expressions of the form α(t1, . . . , tn) where α is an n-ary predicate symbol of L and
t1, . . . , tn are terms of L. The formulas of L will be the atomic formulas of L together
with all expressions having the forms (¬P ), (P → Q), and (∀x)P , where P and Q are
formulas of L and x is an individual variable.
Further logical connectives and the existential quantifier symbol can be introduced
as means for abbreviating other formulas:
(P ∨Q) for ((¬P )→ Q))
(P ∧Q) for (¬(P → (¬Q)))
(P ↔ Q) for ((P → Q) ∧ (Q→ P ))
(∃x)P for (¬(∀x)(¬P ))
For readability, parentheses may be dropped according to (i) ¬ takes priority over ∨ and
∧, (ii) ∨ and ∧ take priority over→ and↔, and (iii) outermost surrounding parentheses
are unneeded.
In a formula of the form (∀x)Q, the expression (∀x) is a (universal) quantifier andQ is
the scope of the quantifier. If x occurs in a formula P within the scope of an occurrence
of (∀x) in P , then that occurrence of x is bound in P by that occurrence of (∀x). If x
2This omits the customary function symbols as they are not needed for the examples discussed here.
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occurs in P and is not bound by any quantifier, then that occurrence of x is free in P .
Note that the same variable x can have both free and bound occurrences in the same
formula P . A formula that does not contain any free variable occurrences is closed.
If an occurrence of x is free in P , then a different variable y is substitutable for that
occurrence of x if the occurrence is not within the scope of the quantifier (∀y) (i.e.,
putting y in place of x does not create a binding of y). Note that this implies that x
is always substitutable for any of its own free occurrences in any P . An individual
constant a is substitutable for any free occurrence of any variable in any P .
Where P is a formula, x is an individual variable, and t is an individual term that is
substitutable for x in P , P (t/x) denotes the formula obtained from P by replacing all
free occurrences of x in P with occurrences of t. Note that the above implies that, if x
does not occur free in P , or does not appear at all in P , then P (t/x) is just P . Note also
that, if t is not substitutable for x in P , then the notation P (t/x) is undefined.
This notation can be extended to arbitrarily many simultaneous replacements as fol-
lows. Where P is a formula, the variables x1, . . . , xn are distinct, and the terms t1, . . . , tn
are substitutable for all the free occurrences of the respective variables x1, . . . , xn in
P , P (t1, . . . , tn/x1, . . . , xn) denotes the formula obtained from P by replacing all occur-
rences of x1, . . . , xn, respectively, with occurrences of t1, . . . , tn.
The axiom schemas will be the meta-level expressions (observing the same rules as
for formulas for dropping parentheses):
(S1). A → (B → A)
(S2). ((A → (B → C))→ ((A → B)→ (A → C))
(S3). (¬A → ¬B)→ (B → A)
(S4). ⊥ ↔ (A ∧ ¬A)
(S5). (∀x)A → B
(S6). (∀x)(A → B)→ (A → (∀x)B)
Let the formula meta symbols A, B,C be denoted generically by A1,A2, . . .,
and let x be the individual variable meta symbol. Where S is a schema, let
S(P1, . . . , Pn, x/A1, . . . ,An,x) be the formula obtained from S by replacing all occur-
rences of A1, . . . ,An, respectively, with occurrences of P1, . . . , Pn, and replacing each
occurrence of x with an occurrence of the individual variable x.
The inference rules will be:
(R1) Schema Instantiation 1. Where S is one of axiom schemas (1) through (4),
infer S(P1, . . . , Pn/ A1, . . . ,An), where A1, . . . ,An are all the distinct formula meta
symbols occurring in S, and P1, . . . , Pn are formulas.
(R2) Schema Instantiation 2. Where S is axiom schema (5), infer
S(P, P (t/x), x/A,B,x), where P is any formula, t is any individual term, and
x is any individual variable.
(R3) Schema Instantiation 3. Where S is axiom schema (6), infer
S(P,Q, x/A,B,x), where P,Q are any formulas and x is any individual vari-
able that does not occur free in P .
(R4) Modus Ponens. From P and P → Q infer Q, where P,Q are any formulas.
(R5) Generalization. From P infer (∀x)P , where P is any formula and x is any
individual variable.
Regarding (R2), note first that, if x occurs free in P , since x is substitutable for itself in
P , by taking x for t this rule allows one to derive (∀x)P → P . Next note that, if x does
not occur free in P , then, by definition of the notation (t/x), P (t/x) is just P , and the
same rule allows one to to derive (∀x)P → P . It follows that all formulas of the form
(∀x)P → P are logical axioms.
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It is not difficult to establish that, if one leaves out (S4), this formalism is equiva-
lent to the first-order predicate calculus of Hamilton [14]. The present (S1), (S2), (S3),
and (S6) are identical to Hamilton’s (K1), (K2), (K3), and (K6), and it can be seen
that (S5) together with (S2) effectively replaces Hamilton’s (K4) and (K5) under the
present restricted notion of term that does not involve function symbols and the agree-
ment that writing P (t/x) implies that t is substitutable for x in P . To wit, the above
note that, if x does not occur free in P , then one can derive (∀x)P → P , gives (K4),
and (K5) is obtained by the fact that, if t is substitutable for x in P , then one can
derive (∀x)P → P (t/x). Thus all of Hamilton’s logical axioms are logical axioms here.
Moreover, excluding (S4), the present formalism does not permit the introduction of
logical axioms not found in Hamilton’s calculus. In other words, with the exception of
(S4), both formalisms have that same logical axioms. Because of this equivalence, the
present formalism can make use of numerous results proved in [14]. Moreover, Hamil-
ton’s system differs from that of Mendelson [22] only in Hamilton’s (K3), and Exercise
4, Chapter 2 of [14] shows that Hamilton’s and Mendelson’s systems are equivalent.
This allows appropriation of numerous results from [22].
A (first-order) theory T will consist of a sublanguage of the foregoing language L,
denoted LT , the foregoing axiom schemas 1 through 6, the foregoing inference rules 1
through 6, and a set of formulas of LT to serve as extralogical axioms of T . By a proof
in T is meant a sequence P1, . . . , Pn of formulas of LT such that each Pi is either (i)
a logical axiom, i.e., is derivable by means of one of the Schema Instantiation rules 1
through 3, (ii) an extralogical axiom, or (iii) can be inferred from formulas occurring
before Pi in the sequence by means of either Modus Ponens or Generalization. Such a
sequence is a proof of the last member Pn. A formula of LT is a theorem of T if it has a
proof in T . The notation T ` P is used to indicate that P is a theorem of T , and T 6 ` P
is used to indicate the contrary.
Consider an entry (Lt, Bt) in the derivation path of a DRS as defined in Section 2.1.
A formula in Bt will be active if its status is bel; otherwise it is inactive. The theory
determined by (Lt, Bt) will be first-order theory Tt whose language is Lt and whose
extralogical axioms are the active extralogical axioms in Bt.
The Dialectical Belief Revision algorithm has the effect of changing the status of
some formulas in the belief set from bel to disbel. This is true also for other belief re-
vision algorithms. Because of this there is no guarantee that the fact that the active
extralogical axioms in Bt are the extralogical axioms of Tt implies that the active for-
mulas in Bt are all theorems of Tt. That this implication can sometimes fail motivates
the following.
A belief revision algorithm for a DRS is normal if, for any entry (Lt, Bt) in a deriva-
tion path for the DRS, given that the active formulas in Bt are theorems of the theory
Tt determined by (Lt, Bt), the active formulas in the belief set Bt′ that results from an
application of that algorithm will be theorems of the theory Tt′ determined by (Lt′ , Bt′).
Proposition 3.1. For any DRS, Dialectical Belief Revision is normal.
A DRS is normal if all its belief revision algorithms are normal.
Proposition 3.2. In a normal DRS, for each theory Tt determined by a pair (Lt, Bt)
in a derivation path for the DRS, the active formulas in Bt will be theorems of Tt.
Where Γ is a set of formulas in LT , let T (Γ) be the theory obtained from T by adjoin-
ing the members of Γ as extralogical axioms.
Proposition 3.3. Let Tt be the theory determined by an entry (Lt, Bt) in the deriva-
tion path for a normal DRS, let T be the theory with language Lt and no extralogical
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axioms, and let Γ be the set of active formulas in Bt. Then, for any formula P of Lt,
Tt ` P iff T (Γ) ` P .
It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the notion of tautology from the Propo-
sitional Calculus (PC). Axiom schemas (S1), (S2), and (S3), together with Modus Po-
nens, are the axiomatization of PC found in [14]. Where T is a theory and P is a
formula of LT , let TPC ` P indicate that P has a proof in T using only (S1), (S2), and
(S3), Instantiation 1, and Modus Ponens. Then, by treating atomic formulas of L as
propositions of PC, one has the following.
Theorem 3.1. (Soundness Theorem for PC) For any theory T , if TPC ` P , then P is
a tautology.
Theorem 3.2. (Adequacy Theorem for PC) For any theory T , if P is a tautology, then
TPC ` P .
These theorems can be used to show that axiom schema (S4) serves merely as a
defining axiom for⊥ and does not enable proving any additional formulas not involving
⊥. Let TPC(⊥) ` P indicate that P has a proof in T using only (S1), (S2), (S3), and (S4),
Schema Instantiation 1, and Modus Ponens.
Proposition 3.4. If P does not contain any occurrences of ⊥ and TPC(⊥) ` P , then
TPC ` P .
A theorem of T is said to be derivable in T . A formula P is said to be derivable from Γ
in T if T (Γ) ` P . Note that this is equivalent to saying that, if T ` Q, for all Q ∈ Γ, then
T ` P . When Γ is given as a list of one or more formulas, e.g., {P1, . . . , Pn}, the sur-
rounding braces will be dropped, i.e., T ({P1, . . . , Pn}) will be shortened to T (P1, . . . , Pn).
An inference rule is a statement of the form ‘From some premises having some forms
A1, . . . ,An, infer the conclusion having some form A’. In the context of a theory T , an
inference rule may be viewed as a mapping from LT into itself, with an application of
the rule being represented as an n + 1-tuple of formulas of LT , (P1, . . . , Pn, P ), where
P1, . . . , Pn are the premises and P is the conclusion. An inference rule is valid (or
derivable) in a theory T , if the conclusion is always derivable from the premises in T ,
i.e., if T (P1, . . . , Pn) ` P . Consider the following inference rules for an arbitrary T .
Hypothetical Syllogism. From P → Q and Q → R infer P → R, where
P,Q,R are any formulas.
Aristotelian Syllogism. From (∀x)(P → Q) and P (a/x), infer Q(a/x), where
P,Q are any formulas, x is any individual variable, and a is any individual con-
stant.
Subsumption. From (∀x)(α(x) → β(x)) and (∀x)(β(x) → γ(x)), infer
(∀x)(α(x) → γ(x)), where α, β, γ are any unary predicate symbols, and x is any
individual variable.
And-Introduction. From P and Q infer P ∧Q.
And-Elimination. From P ∧Q infer P and Q.
Conflict Detection. From (∀x)¬(P ∧ Q), P (a/x), and Q(a/x) infer ⊥, where
P,Q are any formulas, x is any individual variable, and a is any individual con-
stant.
Contradiction Detection. From P and ¬P infer ⊥, where P is any formula.
Hypothetical Syllogism is a well-known principle of classical logic. Aristotelian Syllo-
gism captures the reasoning embodied in the famous argument ‘All men are mortal;
Socrates is a man; therefore Socrates is mortal’, by taking P for ‘is a man’, Q for ‘is
mortal’, and a for ‘Socrates’. A concept A subsumes concept B if the set of objects repre-
sented by A contains the set represented by B as a subset. Thus Subsumption captures
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the transitivity of this subsumption relationship. In the context of a DRS, Conflict De-
tection can be used for triggering Dialectical Belief Revision. This is an example on
one such triggering rule; others surely are possible.
Aristotelian Syllogism, Subsumption, and Conflict Detection will be used in the Doc-
ument Management Assistant application developed in Section 4. In this respect, they
may be considered to be application-specific. They are not domain-specific, however,
inasmuch as they happen to be valid in any first-order theory, as demonstrated by the
following.
Proposition 3.5. The above seven inference rules are valid in any theory T .
A theory T is inconsistent if there is a formula P of LT such that both T ` P and
T ` ¬P ; otherwise T is consistent.
Proposition 3.6. A theory T is consistent iff there is a formula P of LT such that
T 6 ` P .
This shows that any inconsistent system with the full strength of first-order logic is
trivial in that all formulas are formally derivable.
A set Γ of formulas of a language L is consistent if the theory T with language L and
with the formulas in Γ as extralogical axioms is consistent; otherwise Γ is inconsistent.
For an entry (Lt, Bt) in the derivation path of a DRS, Bt is consistent if the set of active
formulas in Bt is consistent; otherwise Bt is inconsistent.
Proposition 3.7. For an entry (Lt, Bt) in the derivation path of a normal DRS, Bt is
consistent if and only if the theory Tt determined by (Lt, Bt) is consistent.
3.2. Semantics and Main Results Regarding First-Order Logic
This formulation of a semantics for first-order logic follows [29]. Let T be a theory of the
kind described above. An interpretation I for the language LT consists of (i) a nonempty
set DI serving as the domain of I, the elements of which are called individuals, (ii) for
each individual constant a of LT , assignment of a unique individual I(a) ∈ DI , and
(iii) for each n-ary predicate symbol α of LT , assignment of an n-ary relation I(α) on
DI . For each individual d ∈ DI , let dˆ be a new individual constant, i.e., one not among
the individual constants of LT , to serve as the name of d. Let LT (I) be the language
obtained from LT by adjoining the names of the individuals in D as new extralogical
symbols. Where I is an interpretation for LT , let I(dˆ) = d for all d ∈ D. For P a formula
of a language L and I and interpretation for L, an I-instance of P is a formula of
the form P (dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn) where x1, . . . , xn are the distinct individual variables
occurring free in P and d1, . . . , dn ∈ DI . Note that I-instances as defined above are
closed.
Given an interpretation I for a language L, a truth valuation is a mapping vI :
closed formulas of L(I)→ {T,F} satisfying:
(1) For P being the atomic formula ⊥, vI(P ) = F.
(2) For P atomic and having the form α(t1, . . . , tn), v(P ) = T iff (I(t1), . . . , I(tn)) ∈ I(α)
(the relation I(α) holds for the n-tuple (I(t1), . . . , I(tn)). Note that, since P is closed,
the ti must all be individual constants and may be names of individuals in DI .
(3) For P of the form ¬Q, vI(P ) = T iff vI(Q) = F.
(4) For P of the form Q→ R, vI(P ) = T iff either vI(Q) = F or vI(R) = T.
(5) For P of the form (∀x)Q, vI(P ) = T iff vI(Q(dˆ/x)) = T for every d ∈ DI .
Items 3 and 4 encapsulate the usual truth tables for ¬ and →. By definition of the
various abbreviated forms, it will follow that, for closed P :
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For P of the form Q ∧R, vI(P ) = T iff vI(Q) = T and vI(R) = T.
For P of the form Q ∨R, vI(P ) = T iff either vI(Q) = T or vI(R) = T.
For P of the form Q↔ R, vI(P ) = T iff vI(Q) = v(R).
For P of the form (∃x)Q, vI(P ) = v((¬(∀x)(¬Q))).
A closed formula P is true or valid in an interpretation I if vI(P ) = T. An open
formula P is valid in an interpretation I if vI(P ′) = T, for all I-instances P ′ of P . The
notation I |= P is used to denote that P is valid in I. A formula P of a language L is
logically valid if it is valid in every interpretation of L.
Proposition 3.8. Let P be a formula of LT in which no individual variable other
than x occurs free, let a be an individual constant of LT , let I be an interpretation of
LT , and let d = I(a). Then I |= P (a/x) iff I |= P (dˆ/x).
Proposition 3.9. For any language L, the logical axioms of L, i.e., all formulas deriv-
able by means of the schema instantiation rules (R1) through (R3), are logically valid.
An inference rule is validity preserving if, for every application (P1, . . . , Pn, P ) com-
prised of formulas in a language LT for a theory T , and for every interpretation I for
LT , I |= P1, . . . , I |= Pn implies I |= P .
Proposition 3.10. Modus Ponens and Generalization are validity preserving.
Theorem 3.3. (Soundness Theorem for FOL) Let T be a theory with no extralogical
axioms and let P be a formula of LT . If T ` P , then P is logically valid.
One can establish the converse, referred to in [14] as the Adequacy Theorem (Proposi-
tion 4.41). This also appears in [22] as Corollary 2.18. The proof in [14] can be adapted
to the present system because of the equivalence between that system and the for-
malism studied here. It is only necessary to verify that the present notion of semantic
interpretation is equivalent to that of [14]. This amounts to observing that the present
notion of I-instance is equivalent with the notion of ‘valuation’ in [14]. Details are
omitted as this result in not needed in the present work.
An interpretation I for the language of a theory T is a model of T if all theorems of
T are valid in I. The notation I |= T expresses that I is a model of T .
Theorem 3.4. (Consistency Theorem) If a theory T has a model, then T is consistent.
Proposition 3.11. If T is a theory with no extralogical axioms, then T is consistent.
An interpretation for a language L is a model for a set Γ of formulas of L if all the
formulas in Γ are valid in I. The notation I |= Γ expresses that I is a model of Γ.
Proposition 3.12. Let Γ be the extralogical axioms of a theory T and let I be an
interpretation for LT . If I |= Γ, then I |= T .
For an entry (Bt, Lt) in the derivation path for a DRS (Section 2.1), an interpretation
I for Lt will be a model of Bt if I |= Γ where Γ is the set of active formulas in Bt. Let
I |= Bt indicate that I is a model of Bt.
Proposition 3.13. Let (Lt, Bt) be an entry in a derivation path for a normal DRS. If
there is an interpretation I of Lt that is a model of Bt, then Bt is consistent.
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4. EXAMPLE 1: A DOCUMENT MANAGEMENT ASSISTANT
A DRS is used to represent the reasoning processes of an artificial agent interact-
ing with its environment. For this purpose the belief set should include a model of the
agent’s environment, with this model evolving over time as the agent acquires more in-
formation about the environment. This section illustrates this idea with a simple DRS
based on first-order logic representing an agent that assists its human users in creat-
ing and managing a taxonomic document classification system. Thus the environment
in this case consists of the document collection together with its users. The objective in
employing such an agent is to build concept taxonomies suitable for browsing. In this
manner the DRS functions as a Document Management Assistant (DMA).
In the DMA, documents are represented by individual constants, and document
classes are represented by unary predicate symbols. Membership of document a in
class α is expressed by the atomic formula α(a); the property of class α being a subset
of class β is expressed by (∀x)(α(x) → β(x)), where x is any individual variable; and
the property of two classes α and β being disjoint is expressed by (∀x)(¬(α(x) ∧ β(x))),
where x is any individual variable. A taxonomic classification hierarchy may thus be
constructed by entering formulas of these forms into the belief set as extralogical ax-
ioms. It will be assumed that these axioms are input by human users.
In addition to the belief set, the DMS will employ an extralogical graphical structure
representing the taxonomy. A formula of the form α(a) will be represented by an is-
an-element-of link from a node representing a to a node representing α, a formula
of the form (∀x)(α(x) → β(x)) will be represented by an is-a-subclass-of link from a
node representing α to a node representing β, and a formula of the form (∀x)(¬(α(x) ∧
β(x))) will be represented by an are disjoint link between some nodes representing
α and β. This structure will be organized as a directed acyclic graph (DAG) without
redundant links with respect to the is-an-element-of and is-a-subclass-of links (i.e.,
ignoring are-disjoint links), where by a redundant link is meant a direct link from
some node to an ancestor of that node other than the node’s immediate ancestors (i.e.,
other than its parents). To this end the controller will maintain a data structure that
represents the current state of this graph. Whenever an axiom expressing a document-
class membership is entered into the belief set, a corresponding is-an-element-of link
will be entered into the graph, unless this would create a redundant path. Whenever
an axiom expressing a subclass-superclass relationship is entered into the belief set,
an is-a-subclass-of link will be entered into the graph, unless this would create either
a cycle or a redundant path. Whenever an axiom expressing class disjointedness is
entered into the belief set, a corresponding link expressing this will be entered into
the graph. To accommodate this activity, the derivation path as a sequence of pairs
is augmented to become a sequence of triples (Lt, Bt, Gt), where Gt is the state of the
graph at time t.
This is illustrated in Figure 4.1, showing a graph that would be defined by enter-
ing the following formulas into the belief set, where TheLibrary, Science, Engineering,
Humanities, ComputerScience, Philosophy, and ArtificialIntelligence are taken as al-
ternative labels for the predicate letters A11, . . . ,A17, where Doc1, Doc2, Doc3 are al-
ternative labels for the individual constants a1,a2,a3, and where x is the individual
variable x1:
(∀x)(Science(x)→ TheLibrary(x))
(∀x)(Engineering(x)→ TheLibrary(x))
(∀x)(Humanities(x)→ TheLibrary(x))
(∀x)(ComputerScience(x)→ Science(x))
(∀x)(ComputerScience(x)→ Engineering(x))
(∀x)(Philosophy(x)→ Humanities(x))
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(∀x)(ArtificialIntelligence(x)→ ComputerScience(x))
(∀x)¬(Engineering(x) ∧Humanities(x))
Science(Doc1)
Engineering(Doc1)
ArtificialIntelligence(Doc2)
Philosophy(Doc3)
The overall purpose of the DMA is to support browsing and search by the human
users. The browsing capability is provided by the graph. For this one would develop
tools for ‘drilling down’ through the graph, progressively narrowing in on specific top-
ics of interest. User queries would consist of keyword searches and would employ the
belief set directly, i.e., they do not necessarily require the graph. In such queries, the
keywords are presumed to be the names of classification categories. The algorithms as-
sociated with the DMA’s controller are designed to derive all document-category clas-
sifications implicit in the graph and enter these into the belief set. These document-
category pairs can be stored in a simple database, and keyword searches, possibly
involving multiple keywords connected by ‘or’ or ‘and’ can be implemented as database
queries. For ‘and’ queries, however, one may alternatively use the graph structure to
find those categories’ common descendants.
As described in Section 2.1, entering a formula into the belief set also entails possibly
expanding the current language by adding any needed new symbols and assigning the
new formula an appropriate label. For the above formulas, the from-list will consist of
an indication that the source of the formula was a human user. Let us use the code
hu for this (as an alternative to the aforementioned es). As an epistemic entrenchment
value, let us arbitrarily assign each formula the value 0.5 on the scale [0, 1]. Thus each
label will have the form
{t, {hu}, ∅, bel , 0.5, a posteriori}
Using 0.5 for the epistemic entrenchment value effectively makes these values non-
functional with respect to Dialectical Belief Revision. When a choice must be made
regarding which of several formulas to disbelieve, this choice will either be random or
made by the human user.
Whenever the user wishes to enter a new formula into the belief set, the formula is
provided to the controller, which executes a reasoning process depending on the type
(or form) of the formula. This process may lead to the controller’s carrying out infer-
ence rule applications, the results of which are provided back to the controller, which
may in turn lead to further rule applications and/or belief revision processes. In this
activity the controller additionally modifies the language and graph as appropriate.
As discussed in Section 2.2, the general purpose of a controller is two-fold: (i) to derive
all salient information for the intended application, and (ii) to ensure that the belief
set remains consistent. In the present case, the salient information is the graph to-
gether with the document classifications implicit in the graph, i.e., all formulas of the
form α(a) that can be derived from the formulas describing the graph. In an applica-
tion, these category-document pairs can be stored in a simple database and used for
keyword-based sorting and retrieval (search).
4.1. Formal Specification of the DMA
These considerations motivate the following formal specification for the DMA. For the
path logic, let the language be the language L for first-order logic defined in Section 3.1,
let the axiom schemas be (S1) through (S6), and let the inference rules be (R1) through
(R5) together with Aristotelian Syllogism, Subsumption, and Conflict Detection. In
accordance with Section 2.1, let L0 be the minimal sublanguage of L consisting of all
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Figure 4.1. A taxonomy fragment.
formulas that can be built up from the atomic formula ⊥, and let B0 = ∅. In addition,
let G0 = ∅.
For the controller, all inputs by human users must be formulas having one of
the forms (i) α(a), (ii) (∀x)(α(x) → β(x)), where α and β are distinct, and (iii)
(∀x)¬(α(x) ∧ β(x)), where α and β are distinct. As mentioned, part of the function
of the controller is to maintain the graphs that are represented in the derivation path
by the Gt. These graphs have two types of nodes: one type representing documents
corresponding to individual constant symbols, and one type representing classifica-
tion categories corresponding to unary predicate symbols. There are three kinds of
links: is-an-element-of links from documents to categories, is-a-subclass-of links be-
tween categories, and are-disjoint links between categories. It is desired that the con-
troller maintain these graphs, ignoring are-disjoint links, as directed acyclic graphs
without redundant links, as described above.
To complete the specification of the controller it is necessary to provide algorithms
that will be executed depending on the type of user input. In the present system, it
is convenient to distinguish between two kinds of input event, the first being when a
formula is provided to the controller by a human user, and the second being when a
formula is provided to the controller as the result of an inference rule application. The
following describes algorithms associated with five such event types. Of these, Event
Types 1, 4, and 5 correspond to user inputs. These are initiating events, each of which
may lead to a sequence of events of some of the other types.
In all the events it is assumed that, if the formula provided to the controller already
exists and is active in the current belief set, its input is immediately rejected. This
prevents unnecessary duplicates. In each of the following, assume that the most recent
entry into the derivation path is (Lt, Bt, Gt).
Event Type 1: A formula of the form α(a) is provided to the controller by a human
user. If either α or a is not in the symbol set for Lt, form Lt+1 by adding the missing
ones to the symbol set for Lt; otherwise set Lt+1 = Lt. Form Bt+1 from Bt by adding
the labeled formula (α(a), {t + 1, {hu}, ∅, bel , 0.5, a posteriori}). If there are no nodes
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representing either a or α in Gt, form Gt+1 by adding such nodes together with an is-
an-element-of link from the a node to the α node. If one of a and α is represented by a
node in Gt but the other is not, form Gt+1 by adding a node representing the one that
is missing together with an is-an-element-of link from the a node to the α node. Note
that if a category node is being added, this will become a root node. If both a and α are
represented by nodes in Gt, form Gt+1 by adding an is-an-element-of link from the a
node to the α node, unless this would create a redundant path in the graph.
Search Bt+1 for active formulas of the forms (∀x)¬(α(x)∧β(x)) or (∀x)¬(β(x)∧α(x)),
where α is the predicate symbol of the input formula and β is some predicate symbol
other than α, and, if found, search for an active occurrence of β(a), where a is the
individual constant of the input formula, and for each successful such search, apply
Conflict Detection to infer ⊥ and provide this formula to the controller. This is an
event of Type 2.
Let Bt∗ be the most recent belief set, i.e., either it is Bt+1 or it is the belief set that
has resulted from the processes associated with the indicated events of Type 2, if any
occurred. If the input formula α(a) is still active, search Bt∗ for any active formulas
having the form (∀x)(α(x) → β(x)), where α is the predicate symbol of the input for-
mula. For each such formula, apply Aristotelian Syllogism to this and the formula α(a)
to infer β(a), and provide this formula to the controller. This is an event of Type 3.
Event Type 2: The formula ⊥ is provided to the controller as the result of an appli-
cation of Conflict Detection. Let Lt+1 = Lt. Form Bt+1 from Bt by (i) adding the labeled
formula (⊥, {t + 1, F, ∅, bel , 0.5, a posteriori}), where the from-list F contains the name
of the inference rule (Conflict Detection) that was used to conclude this occurrence of
⊥, together with the indexes of the formulas that served as premises in the rule ap-
plication, and (ii) updating the to-lists of all formulas that thus served as premises by
including the index t+ 1. Let Gt+1 = Gt.
Now invoke the Dialectical Belief Revision algorithm on Bt+1 as described in Sec-
tion 2.2, starting with the formula ⊥ just added to the belief set. As a result of this
process, some formulas in the current belief set will have their status changed from
bel to disbel. Let Bt+2 be the belief set obtained from Bt+1 by making these changes
in the relevant formulas’ labels. Let Lt+2 = Lt+1. Obtain Gt+2 from Gt+1 by removing
any elements representing formulas whose statuses have thus been changed to disbel.
Specifically, (i) if a formula of the form α(a) is disbelieved, remove the is-an-element-of
link connecting the node representing a to the node representing α, and remove the
node representing a, unless it is connected to some node other than the one represent-
ing α, and (ii) if a formula of the form (∀x)(α(x) → β(x)) is disbelieved, remove the
is-a-subclass-of link connecting the node representing α to the node representing β,
and remove the node representing α, unless it is connected to some node other than
the one representing β.
Event Type 3: A formula of the form α(a) is provided to the controller as a result
of an inference rule application (Aristotelian Syllogism). In this case, both α and a are
already in Lt, so let Lt+1 = Lt. Form Bt+1 from Bt by (i) adding the labelled formula
(α(a), {t + 1, F, ∅, bel , 0.5, a posteriori}), where the from-list F contains the name of the
inference rule that was used to infer α(a) (Aristotelian Syllogism), together with the
indexes of the formulas that served as premises in the rule application, and (ii) up-
dating the to-lists of all formulas that thus served as premises by including the index
t + 1. Let Gt+1 = Gt. Note that no modification of the graph is warranted, since the
membership of the document associated with a in the category associated with α is
already implicit in the graph, so that a link between the respective nodes would form
a redundant path.
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Search Bt+1 for active formulas of the forms (∀x)¬(α(x)∧β(x)) or (∀x)¬(β(x)∧α(x)),
where α is the predicate symbol of the input formula and β is some predicate symbol
other that α, and, if found, search for an active occurrence of β(a), where a is the
individual constant of the input formula, and for each successful such search, apply
Conflict Detection to infer ⊥ and provide this formula to the controller. This is an
event of Type 2.
Let Bt∗ be the most recent belief set, i.e., either it is Bt+1 or it is the belief set that
has resulted from the processes associated with the indicated events of Type 2, if any
occurred. If the input formula α(a) is still active, search Bt∗ for any active formulas
having the form (∀x)(α(x) → β(x)), where α is the predicate symbol of the input for-
mula. For each such formula, apply Aristotelian Syllogism to this and the formula α(a)
to infer β(a), and provide this formula to the controller. This is a recursive occurrence
of an event of Type 3.
Event Type 4: A formula of the form (∀x)(α(x)→ β(x)) is provided to the controller
by a human user. If both α and β are already in Lt, begin by performing as many as
possible of the following three actions. First, search Bt to determine if either of the
formulas (∀x)¬(α(x) ∧ β(x)) and (∀x)¬(β(x) ∧ α(x)) are active, and, if so, reject the
input and inform the user that the input is disallowed inasmuch as it contradicts the
current belief set. Second, explore all ancestors of α to see if they include β, and, if so,
reject the input and inform the user that the input is disallowed inasmuch as it would
create a redundant path in the subsumption hierarchy. Third, explore all ancestors
of β as expressed by formulas in Bt to determine whether these include α, and, if so,
reject the input and inform the user that the input is disallowed inasmuch as it would
create a loop in the subsumption hierarchy. If the input is not rejected for any of these
reasons, do the following.
If either α or β is not in the symbol set for Lt, form Lt+1 by adding the ones that
are missing, otherwise let Lt+1 = Lt. Form Bt+1 from Bt by adding the labeled formula
((∀x)(α(x)→ β(x)), {t+1, {hu}, ∅, bel , 0.5, a posteriori}). If there are no nodes represent-
ing either α or β in Gt, form Gt+1 by adding such nodes together with an is-a-subclass-
of link from the α node to the β node. If one of α and β is represented by a node in Gt
but the other is not, form Gt+1 by adding a node representing the one that is missing
together with an is-a-subclass-of link from the α node to the β node. If both α and β
are represented by nodes in Gt, form Gt+1 by adding an is-a-subclass-of link from the
α node to the β node.
Now search Bt+1 for any active formulas of the form α(a) where α is the predicate
symbol in the input formula, and, for each such formula, apply Aristotelian Syllogism
to infer β(a), and provide this to the controller. This is an event of Type 3.
Event Type 5: A formula of the form (∀x)(¬(α(x)∧β(x))) is provided to the controller
by a user. If either α or β is not in the symbol set for Lt, form Lt+1 by adding the ones
that are missing, otherwise let Lt+1 = Lt. Form Bt+1 from Bt by adding the labeled
formula ((∀x)(¬(α(x)∧β(x))), {t+ 1, {hu}, ∅, bel , 0.5, a posteriori}). If there are no nodes
representing either α or β in Gt, form Gt+1 by adding such nodes together with an
are-disjoint link between the two nodes. If one of α and β is represented by a node
in Gt but the other is not, form Gt+1 by adding a node representing the one that is
missing together with an are-disjoint link between the two nodes. If both α and β are
represented by nodes in Gt, then form Gt+1 by adding an are-disjoint link between the
two nodes.
Having accomplished this, searchBt+1 for active formulas of the forms α(a) and β(a),
and, if found, apply Conflict Detection to infer the formula ⊥, and provide this to the
controller. This is an event of Type 2.
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It may be noted that the above does not provide for the user’s removing links from
the graph, or more exactly, changing the status of an extralogical axiom from bel to
disbel. An ability to do so would obviously be desirable in any practical application. In
particular, if the user wished to modify the graph by inserting a new category repre-
sented by γ between two existing categories represented by α and β, one would need
to remove the link between (the categories represented by) α and β, and then add a
link from α to γ and a link from γ to β. It is not difficult to see that removing a link
can be handled in a straightforward manner, simply by following to-lists starting with
the formula (∀x)(α(x)→ β(x)) representing the link between α and β and changing all
formulas whose derivations relied on that formula to disbel. In effect, this undoes the
event of adding the link in question, as well as any further additions to the belief set
that may have been based on the presence of the link.
Note also that none of the given events employ the Subsumption rule. This is be-
cause, in the present example, information regarding subsumption among the cate-
gories was not included as part of the ‘salient information’. Such could be added to a
future example, but this would make the associated algorithms more complex.
Proposition 4.1. The DMA is a normal DRS.
4.2. Illustration
The application of the algorithms associated with the foregoing events can be illus-
trated by considering the inputs needed to create the concept taxonomy shown in Fig-
ure 4.1. Let us abbreviate ‘TheLibrary’, ‘Science’, ‘Engineering’, ‘Humanities’, ‘Com-
puterScience’, ‘Philosophy’, and ‘ArtificialIntelligence’, respectively, by ‘TL’, ‘S’, ‘E’, ‘H’,
‘CS’, ‘P’, and ‘AI’. In accordance with the definition of derivation path in Section 2.1,
the language L0 will be the language generated by the logical symbols given in Section
3.1, i.e., by σ0 = {x1,x2, . . . , ‘,’, ‘(’, ‘)’,¬,∨,∀,⊥}. This means that the only formula in L0
is ⊥. Also in accordance with the Section 2.1, belief set B0 = ∅. In accordance with the
definition of the DMA, set G0 = ∅.
Consider an input of the first formula in the foregoing list, namely, (∀x)(S(x) →
TL(x)). This is an event of Type 4. The language L1 is formed from L0 by adding the
symbols S and TL (or, more exactly, the predicate letters A12 and A11), i.e., σ1 = σ0 ∪{S,TL}. The belief setB1 is formed fromB0 by adding the labeled formula ((∀x)(S(x)→
TL(x)), {1, {hu}, ∅, bel , 0.5, a posteriori}). The graph G1 is formed from G0 by adding the
vertices TL, S and the edge (link) (S,TL).
The inputs of the next six formulas in the foregoing list are all handled similarly,
each comprising an event of Type 4. This leads to a language L7 generated by symbol
set σ7 = σ0 ∪ {TL,S,E,H,CS,P,AI}. Belief set B7 will consist of the seven indicated
labeled formulas with indexes (time stamps) 1 through 7. Graph G7 will consist of the
vertices TL, S, E, H, CS, P, AI and the seven is-a-subclass-of links shown in Figure 4.1.
Input of (∀x)¬(E(x) ∧ H(x)) is an event ot Type 5. This gives L8 = L7, B8 is formed
from B7 by adding the given input formula together with a label having index 8, and
G8 is formed from G7 by adding the are-disjoint edge (E, H).
Consider input of the formula S(Doc1). This is an event of Type 1. This gives symbol
set σ9 = σ8 ∪ {Doc1}, the belief set B9 is formed from B8 by adding the input for-
mula with a label having index 9, and graph G9 is obtained from G8 by adding the
is-an-element-of edge (Doc1,S). The algorithm for Event Type 1 then proceeds to apply
Aristotelian Syllogism to the input formula and the formula (∀x)(S(x) → TH(x)) that
was input in step 1 (counting B0 as step 0). This derives the formula TL(Doc1) and
provides this formula to the controller. This is an event of Type 3. The effect of the
algorithm for this event type is that L10 = L9, G10 = G9, and B10 is formed from B9
by adding the newly derived formula with a label having index 10. In addition, the
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from-list in the label for the derived formula is set to {AristotelianSyllogism, 9, 1}, and
the to-lists in the label for formulas with indexes 9 and 1 are set to {10}. For brevity in
the following, assume that similar updatings of from-lists and to-lists are performed as
appropriate in accordance with the definitions in Section 2.1. Note that a from-list will
refer to at most one inference rule and set of premises, whereas a to-list may contain
indexes of any number of derived conclusions.
Consider input of the formula E(Doc1). This is an event of Type 1. This gives L11 =
L10, B11 is formed from B10 by adding the input formula with a label having index
11, and G11 is formed from G10 by adding the edge (Doc1,E). The algorithm for Event
Type 1 then proceeds to apply Aristotelian Syllogism to this formula and the formula
(∀x)(E(x) → TH(x)) that was input in step 2. This derives the formula TL(Doc1) and
provides this formula to the controller. This is an event of Type 3. Since the formula
TL(Doc1) is already in the belief set, the rule that duplicates are forbidden is invoked
and the algorithm for Event Type 3 is not invoked.
Consider input of the formula AI(Doc2). This is an event of Type 1. This gives symbol
set σ12 = σ11 ∪ {Doc2}, the belief set B12 is formed from B11 by adding the input
formula with a label having index 12, and graph G12 is obtained from G11 by adding
the is-an-element-of edge (Doc2,AI). The algorithm for Event Type 1 then proceeds
to apply Aristotelian Syllogism to this formula and the formula (∀x)(AI(x) → CS(x))
that was input in step 7. This derives the formula CS(Doc2) and provides this formula
to the controller. This is an event of Type 3. The algorithm for Type 3 is invoked,
giving L13 = L12, B13 is formed from B12 by adding the derived formula with a label
having index 13, and G13 = G12. Then, continuing with the algorithm for Event Type
3, Aristotelian Syllogism is applied to this formula and the formula (∀x)(CS(x)→ S(x))
that was input in step 4. This derives the formula S(Doc2) and provides this formula
to the controller. This is a recursive invocation of Event Type 3 leading to L14 = L13,
B14 is formed from B13 by adding the derived formula with a label having index 14,
and G14 = G13. Then, continuing with the algorithm for Event Type 3, Aristotelian
Syllogism is applied to this formula and the formula (∀x)(S(x) → TL(x)) that was
input in step 4 (as this is the next formula in the belief set to which the inference
rule can be applied). This derives the formula TL(Doc2) and provides this formula to
the controller, which is another event of Type 3. The algorithm for this event type
yields L15 = L14, B15 is formed from B14 by adding the derived formula with a label
having index 15, and G15 = G14. Since there are no opportunities to apply Aristotelian
Syllogism with this formula, the recursion now backtracks to the first invocation of
Event Type 3, since there is another opportunity to apply Aristotelian Syllogism at that
point, this time to the derived formula CS(Doc2) and the formula (∀x)(CS(x) → E(x))
that was input in step 5. The algorithm proceeds similarly with the foregoing, giving
L16 = L15, B16 is formed from B15 by adding the formula E(Doc2) with a label having
index 16, G16 = G15, and then Aristotelian Syllogism is applied deriving TL(Doc2),
giving an event of Type 3 whose algorithm is not invoked because of the rule forbidding
duplicates in the belief set.
Consider input of the formula P(Doc3). This is an event of Type 1. Similarly with the
foregoing, this gives symbol set σ17 = σ16 ∪ {Doc3}, B17 is formed from B16 by adding
the input formula with a label having index 17, and G17 is formed from G16 by adding
the edge (Doc3,P). The algorithm for Event Type 1 then proceeds to apply Aristotelian
Syllogism to this formula and the formula (∀x)(P(x) → H(x)) that was input in step
6. This derives the formula H(Doc3) and provides this formula to the controller. This
is an event of Type 3. The algorithm for Type 3 is invoked, giving L18 = L17, B18 is
formed fromB17 by adding the derived formula with a label having index 18, andG18 =
G17. Then, continuing with the algorithm for Event Type 3, Aristotelian Syllogism is
applied to this formula and the formula (∀x)(H(x) → TL(x)) that was input in step 3.
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This derives the formula LT(Doc2) and provides this formula to the controller, which
is another event of Type 3. The algorithm for this event type yields L19 = L18, B19
is formed from B18 by adding the derived formula with a label having index 19, and
G19 = G18. Since there are no opportunities to apply Aristotelian Syllogism with this
formula, the algorithm terminates.
This completes the construction of the taxonomy in Figure 4.1. At this
point the language L19 is the one generated by symbol set σ19 = σ0 ∪
{TL,S,E,H,CS,P,AI,Doc1,Doc2,Doc3}, the belief set B19 consists of the labeled for-
mulas described above listed in the order of their indexes 1 through 19, and G19 con-
sists of the nodes and edges shown in Figure 4.1. Note that, at each time step t, the
belief set Bt contains all formulas of the form α(a) that are implicit in the graph Gt.
Now suppose the user inputs CS(Doc3). This is an event of Type 1. Since both CS
and Doc3 are in the current symbol set, this gives L20 = L19, B20 is formed from B19
by adding the input formula with a label having index 20, and G20 is formed from
G19 by adding the edge (Doc3,CS). The algorithm for Event Type 1 then proceeds to
apply Aristotelian Syllogism to this formula and the formula (∀x)(CS(x) → S(x)) that
was input in step 4. This derives the formula S(Doc3) and provides this formula to
the controller. This is an event of Type 3. The algorithm for Type 3 is invoked, giving
L21 = L20, B21 is formed from B20 by adding the derived formula with a label hav-
ing index 21, and G21 = G20. Then, continuing with the algorithm for Event Type 3,
Aristotelian Syllogism is applied to this formula and the formula (∀x)(S(x) → TL(x))
that was input in step 1. This derives the formula TL(Doc3) and provides this formula
to the controller. This is a recursive invocation of Event Type 3 leading to L22 = L21,
B22 is formed from B21 by adding the derived formula with a label having index 22,
and G22 = G21. Since there are no further opportunities to apply Aristotelian Syllo-
gism, the recursion backtracks and then continues with the next opportunity to apply
Aristotelian syllogism on the previous invocation of Event Type 3, namely, it applies
the rule to CS(Doc3) and the formula (∀x)(CS(x) → E(x)) which was input in step
5. This derives the formula E(Doc3) and provides this formula to the controller. This
is an event of Type 3. The algorithm for Type 3 is invoked, giving L23 = L22, B23
is formed from B22 by adding the derived formula with a label having index 23, and
G23 = G22. Then, continuing with the algorithm for Event Type 3, then moves on to
the phase where it searches for formulas comprising a conflict. (Note that this phase
was also required in all the above occurrences of Event Type 3, but, for brevity, was
not mentioned as there would have been no conflict to detect). A conflict arises from
the formula E(Doc3) just derived, the formula H(Doc3) entered in step 18, and the for-
mula (∀x)¬(E(x) ∧ H(x)) input in step 8. Then Conflict Detection is applied to infer
⊥ and this is provided to the controller. This is an event of Type 2, giving L24 = L23,
B24 is formed from B23 by adding the input formula with a label having index 24, and
G24 = G23. Then Dialectical Belief revision is invoked. To-lists of the premises in the
application of Conflict Detection are explored, leading backwards through the deriva-
tions to the extralogical axioms (∀x)¬(E(x) ∧ H(x)), (∀x)(CS(x) → E(x)), CS(Doc3),
(∀x)(P(x)→ H(x)), and P(Doc3).
Let us suppose that the user decides to resolve the conflict by changing the status
of CS(Doc3) to disbel. Then, starting with this formula, to-lists are followed and the
statuses of the derived formulas are changed to disbel. In order, these are S(Doc3),
TL(Doc3), E(Doc3), and ⊥. This effectively restores the language, belief set, and graph
to the state they were in before the formula CS(Doc3) was input. More exactly, L25 =
L24 (which = L19), B25 is obtained from B24 by making the indicated status changes,
so that the active formulas are just the ones in B19, and G25 = G24 (which = G19).
The user could have alternatively chosen to disbelieve one of the other discovered
extralogical axioms. For example, suppose that (∀x)(CS(x) → E(x)) is chosen. In step
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16 this formula was used together with CS(Doc2) to infer E(Doc2), and in step 23
this formula was used together with CS(Doc3) to infer E(Doc3) (so the to-list for this
formula is {16, 23}). Accordingly, Dialectical Belief Revision proceeds to change the
status of both of these derived formulas to disbel, and then, as above, changing the
status of the derived ⊥. Moreover, the is-a-subset-of link from CS to E is removed
from the graph. Thus, in this case, L25 = L24, B25 is obtained from B24 by making the
indicated status changes, andG25 is obtained fromG24 by removing the indicated edge.
This result is different than the one above, but the belief set is nonetheless consistent.
As can be seen, the algorithms provided here are completely finitary, and they are
sufficiently precisely defined that it is clear they can be implemented on a conventional
computer. To reach this point was the primary goal of the present research. Moreover,
the given example helps to show that the algorithms have the desired effect, namely, (i)
the graph is maintained in the proper form as a DAG without redundant links, (ii) all
formulas of the form α(a) implicit in the graph are derived and entered into the belief
set, and (iii) whenever a triggered algorithm terminates, the belief set is consistent
(even though it might not have been during the algorithm’s processing). That this will
always be the case is established in the next two subsections.
4.3. Saliency
That the DMA controller produces all relevant salient information as prescribed above
can be summarized as a pair of theorems.
Theorem 4.1. The foregoing algorithms serve to maintain the graph, ignoring are-
disjoint links, as a directed acyclic graph without redundant links.
Thus leaf nodes will be either documents or empty classification categories; if a doc-
ument is linked to some category, it is not directly linked to any ancestors of that cat-
egory; and no category is directly linked to any of its ancestors other than its parents.
This makes the graph useful for visualization and browsing.
In addition, the algorithms ensure that the belief set will contain explicit represen-
tation of all and only the document-category classifications implicit in the graph. This
amounts to the following.
Theorem 4.2. After any process initiated by a user input terminates, the resulting
belief set will contain a formula of the form α(a) iff the formula is derivable from the
formulas corresponding to links in the graph.
4.4. Correctness
From an intuitive standpoint there are good reasons to believe that the given algo-
rithms should serve to preserve the consistency of the belief set for a DMA. These
reasons are (i) it seems evident that the only way it is possible for an inconsistency to
arise is if there occurs a formula of the form (∀x)¬(α(x) ∧ β(x)) together formulas of
the form α(a) and β(a), (ii) the foregoing Theorem 6 guarantees that this can be deter-
mined simply by scanning the (finite) contents of the belief set, and (iii) the presence of
such formulas automatically triggers an application of Dialectical Belief Revision, in
which the offending conflict is removed. By definition, however, consistency requires
that there be no formula P such that both P and ¬P are formally derivable in the
first-order theory that has the active members of the belief set its extralogical axioms,
and this is not explicitly guaranteed by these reasons. Moreover, there evidently is no
straightforward proof-theoretic argument that will guarantee this. These considera-
tions motivate the following model-theoretic argument.
Theorem 4.3. For any derivation path in the DMA, the belief set that results at the
conclusion of a process initiated by a user input will be consistent.
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5. EXAMPLE 2: MULTIPLE INHERITANCE WITH EXCEPTIONS
The main objective of [27] was to show how a DRS framework could be used to formu-
late reasoning about property inheritance with exceptions, where the underlying logic
was a probabilistic ‘logic of qualified syllogisms’. This work was inspired in part by the
frame-based systems due to Minsky [24] and constitutes an alternative formulation of
the underlying logic (e.g., as discussed by Hayes [16]).
What was missing in [27] was the notion of a controller. There a reasoning system
was presented and shown to provide intuitively plausible solutions to numerous ‘puz-
zles’ that had previously appeared in the literature on nonmonotonic reasoning (e.g.,
Opus the Penguin [35], Nixon Diamond [36], and Clyde the Elephant [36]). But there
was nothing to guide the reasoning processes—no means for providing a sense of pur-
pose for the reasoning agent. The present work fills this gap by adding a controller
similar to the one described for the Document Management Assistant. Moreover, it
deals with a simpler system based on first-order logic and remands further exploita-
tion of the logic of qualified syllogisms to a later work. The kind of DRS developed in
this section will be termed a multiple inheritance system (MIS).
For this application the language L given in Section 3.1 is expanded by including
some typed predicate symbols, namely, some unary predicate symbols A(k)1 ,A
(k)
2 , . . .
representing kinds of things (any objects), and some unary predicate symbols
A
(p)
1 ,A
(p)
2 , . . . representing properties of things. The superscripts k and p are applied
also to generic denotations. Thus an expression of the form (∀x)(α(k)(x) → β(p)(x))
represents the proposition that all αs have property β. These new predicate symbols
are used here purely as syntactical items for purposes of defining an extralogical ‘speci-
ficity principle’ and some associated extralogical graphical structures and algorithms.
Semantically they are treated exactly the same as other predicate symbols.
A multiple-inheritance hierarchy H will be a directed graph consisting of a set of
nodes together with a set of links represented as ordered pairs of nodes. Nodes may
be either object nodes, kind nodes, or property nodes. A link of the form (object node,
kind node) will be an object-kind link, one of the form (kind node, kind node) will be
a subkind-kind link, and one of the form (kind node, property node) will be a has-
property link. There will be no other types of links. Object nodes will be labeled with
(represent) individual constant symbols, kind nodes will be labeled with (represent)
kind-type unary predicate symbols, and property nodes will be labeled with (represent)
property-type unary predicate symbols or negations of such symbols. In addition, each
property type predicate symbol with bear a numerical subscript, called an occurrence
index, indicating an occurrence of that symbol in a given hierarchy H. These indexes
are used to distinguish different occurrences of the same property-type symbol in H.
An object-kind link between an individual constant symbol a and a predicate symbol
α(k) will represent the formula α(k)(a), a subkind-kind link between a predicate symbol
α(k) and a predicate symbol β(k) will represent the formula (∀x)(α(k)(x)→ β(k)(x)), and
a has-property link between a predicate symbol α(k) and a predicate symbol β(p)1 will
represent the formula (∀x)(α(k)(x)→ β(p)1 (x)).
Given such an H, there is defined on the object nodes and the kind nodes a specificity
relation >s (read ‘more specific than’) according to: (i) if (node1,node2) is either an
object-kind link or a kind-kind link, then node1 >s node2, and (ii) if node1 >s node2
and node2 >s node3, then node1 >s node3. We shall also have a dual generality relation
>g (read ‘more general than’) defined by node1 >g node2 iff node1 <s node2. It follows
that object nodes are maximally specific and minimally general. It also follows that
H may have any number of maximally general nodes, and in fact that it need not be
connected. A maximally general node is a root node. A path in a hierarchy H (not to
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be confused with the path in a path logic) will be a sequence node1, . . . ,noden wherein,
node1 is a root node and, for each i = 1, . . . , n− 2, the pair (nodei+1,nodei) is a subkind-
kind link, and, the pair (noden,noden−1) is either a subkind-kind link or an object-kind
link. Note that property nodes do not participate in paths as here defined.
Similarly as with the graphs used in the Document Management Assistant, it is
desired to organize a multiple inheritance hierarchy as a directed acyclic graph (DAG)
without redundant links with respect to the object-kind and subkind-kind links (i.e.,
here ignoring has-property links), where, as before, by a redundant link is meant a
direct link from some node to an ancestor of that node other than the node’s immediate
ancestors (i.e., other than its parents). More exactly, two distinct paths will form a
redundant pair if they have some node in common beyond the first place where they
differ. This means that they comprise two distinct paths to the common node(s). A
path will be simply redundant (or redundant in H) if it is a member of a redundant
pair. As before, a path contains a loop if it has more than one occurrence of the same
node. Provisions are made in the following to ensure that hierarchies with loops or
redundant paths are not allowed. As is customary, the hierarchies will be drawn with
the upward direction being from more specific to less (less general to more), so that
roots appear at the top and objects appear at the bottom. Kind-property links will
extend horizontally from their associated kind nodes.
In terms of the above specificity relation on H, we can assign an address to each
object and kind node in the following manner. Let the addresses of the root nodes, in
any order, be (1), (2), (3), . . .. Then for the node with address (1), say, let the next most
specific nodes in any order have the addresses (1, 1), (1, 2), (1, 3), . . .; let the nodes next
most specific to the one with address (1, 1) have addresses (1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 2), (1, 1, 3), . . .;
and so on. Thus an address indicates the node’s position in the hierarchy relative to
some root node. Inasmuch as an object or kind node may be more specific than several
different root nodes, the same node may have more than one such address. Note that
the successive initial segments of an address are the addresses of the nodes appearing
in the path from the related root node to the node having that initial segment as its
address. Let > denote the usual lexicographic order on addresses. We shall apply >
also to the nodes having those addresses. It is easily verified that node1 > node2 iff
node1 >s node2. For object and kind nodes, we shall use the term specificity rank (or
just rank) synonymously with ‘address’.
Since, as mentioned, it is possible for any given object or kind node to have more
than one address, it thus can have more than one rank. Two nodes are comparable
with respect to the specificity relation >s, however, only if they appear on the same
path, i.e., only if one node is an ancestor of the other, in which case only the rank each
has acquired due to its being on that path will apply. Thus, if two nodes are comparable
with respect to their ranks by the relation>, there is no ambiguity regarding the ranks
being compared.
Having thus defined specificity ranks for object and kind nodes, let us agree that
each property node inherits the rank of the kind node to which it is linked. Thus for
property nodes the rank is not an address.
An example of such a hierarchy is shown in Figure 5.1. Here ‘Tweety’ and ‘Opus’ may
be taken as names for the individual constants a1 and a2, and ‘Bird(k)’, ‘Penguin(k)’, and
‘CanFly(p)’ can be taken as names, respectively, for the unary predicate symbols A(k)1 ,
A
(k)
2 , and A
(p)
1 . [Note: The superscripts are retained on the names only to visually
identify the types of the predicate symbols, and could be dropped without altering the
meanings.] The links represent the formulas
(∀x)(Penguin(k)(x)→ Bird(k)(x))
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OpusTweety
Bird(k) CanFly
(p)
1
¬CanFly(p)2Penguin(k)
Figure 5.1. Tweety the Bird and Opus the Penguin as an MIS.
(∀x)(Bird(k)(x)→ CanFly(p)1 (x))
(∀x)(Penguin(k)(x)→ ¬CanFly(p)2 (x))
Bird(k)(Tweety)
Penquin(k)(Opus)
The subscripts 1 and 2 on the predicate symbol CanFly(p) in the graph distinguish the
different occurrences of this symbol in the graph, and the same subcripts on the sym-
bol occurrences in the formulas serve to correlate these with their occurrences in the
graph. Note that these are just separate occurrences of the same symbol, however, and
therefore have identical semantic interpretations. Formally, CanFly(p)1 and CanFly
(p)
2
can be taken as standing for A(p)11 and A
(p)
12
with the lower subscripts being regarded
as extralogical notations indicating different occurrences of A(p)1 .
This figure reveals the rationale for the present notion of multiple-inheritance hier-
archy. The intended interpretation of the graph is that element nodes and kind nodes
inherit the properties of their parents, with the exception that more specific property
nodes take priorty and block inheritances from those that are less specific. Let us re-
fer to this as the specificity principle. In accordance with this principle, in Figure 5.1
Tweety inherits the property CanFly from Bird, but Opus does not inherit this prop-
erty because the inheritance is blocked by the more specific information that Opus is
a Penguin and Penguins cannot fly.
Bird
Penguin
Flier
Tweety Opus
Is−a
Is−a
Is−a
Is−a
Is−not−a
Figure 5.2. Tweety the Bird and Opus the Penguin, original version.
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Figure 5.1 constitutes a rethinking of the well-known example of Opus the penguin
depicted in Figure 5.2 (adapted from [35]). The latter is problematic in that, by one
reasoning path one can conclude that Opus is a flier, and by another reasoning path
that he is not. This same contradiction is implicit in the formulas introduced above,
since if one were to apply the axioms and rules of first-order logic as given in Section 3,
one could derive both CanFly(p)(Opus) and ¬CanFly(p)(Opus), in which case the system
would be inconsistent.
5.1. Formal Specification of an Arbitrary MIS
We are now in a position to define the desired kind of DRS. For the path logic, let
the language be the one described above, obtained from the L of Section 3.1 by ad-
joining the additional unary kind-type and property-type predicate symbols, let the
axiom schemas be (S1) through (S6), and let the inference rules be (R1) through (R5)
together with Aristotelian Syllogism and Contradiction Detection. Thus the path logic
component of an MIS is essentially identical to that of a DMA, the only exception be-
ing that we here use Contradiction Detection instead of Conflict Detection. Also, the
subsumption rule is omitted here, since as with the DMA as described in Section 4,
this rule is not required. It follows that all the results of Section 3 will apply. Similarly
with the DMA, derivation paths will consist of triples (Lt, Bt, Ht), where these com-
ponents respectively are the (sub)language (of L), belief set, and multiple inheritance
hierarchy at time t. In accordance with Section 2.1, let L0 be the minimal sublanguage
of L consisting of all formulas that can be built up from the atomic formula ⊥, and let
B0 = ∅. In addition, let H0 = ∅.
The controller for an MIS is defined analogously with that for the DMA, but differs
in several important respects. In particular, the MIS controller is designed to enforce
the above specificity principle. It may also be noted that this rendition of the MIS does
not allow one to express that two kind categories are disjoint (although this could be
included if desired), so that the source of contradictory formulas that was inherent in
the DMA is not present here. Nonetheless contradictions can arise in an MIS that has
inherently contradictory root nodes in its multiple inheritance hierarchy. An example
of this (the famous Nixon Diamond [36]) will be discussed. The purpose of the MIS
controller will be essentially the same as for the DMA controller, namely (i) to derive
and enter into the belief set all object classification implicit in the multiple inheri-
tance hierarchy, i.e., all formulas of the form α(k)(a) that can be derived from formulas
describing the hierarchy (while observing the specificity principle), and (ii) to ensure
that the belief set remains consistent. Item (i) thus defines what will be considered
the salient information for an MIS. Also similarly with the DMA, the MIS controller is
intended to maintain the multiple inheritance hierarchy as a DAG without redundant
paths, only here with respect to just the object and kind nodes. Formulas that can be
input by the users may have one of the forms (i) α(k)(a), (ii) (∀x)(α(k)(x) → β(k)(x)),
(iii) (∀x)(α(k)(x) → β(p)(x)), and (iv) (∀x)(α(k)(x) → ¬β(p)(x)). Again it will be agreed
that the epistemic entrenchment value for all input formulas is 0.5.
We may now define some algorithms that are to be executed in response to each type
of user input. There will be eight types of events. Event Types 1, 6, 7 and 8 correspond
to user inputs, and the others occur as the result of rule applications. As before, in all
such events it is assumed that, if the formula provided to the controller already exists
and is active in the current belief set, its input is immediately rejected. In each event,
assume that the most recent entry into the derivation path is (Lt, Bt, Ht).
Event Type 1: A formula of the form α(k)(a) is provided to the controller by a human
user. If either α(k) or a is not in the symbol set for Lt, form Lt+1 by adding the missing
ones to the symbol set for Lt; otherwise set Lt+1 = Lt. Form Bt+1 from Bt by adding
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the labeled formula (α(k)(a), {t + 1, {hu}, ∅, bel , 0.5, a posteriori}). If there are no nodes
representing either a or α(k) in Ht, form Ht+1 by adding such nodes together with an
object-kind link from the a node to the α(k) node. If one of a and α(k) is represented
by a node in Ht but the other is not, form Ht+1 by adding a node representing the one
that is missing together with an object-kind link from the a node to the α(k) node. Note
that if a kind node is being added, this will become a root node. If both a and α(k) are
represented by nodes in Gt, form Gt+1 by adding an object-kind link from the a node
to the α(k) node, unless this would create a redundant path.
SearchBt+1 for any active formulas having the form (∀x)(α(k)(x)→ β(k)(x)), where α
is the predicate symbol of the input formula. For each such formula, apply Aristotelian
Syllogism to this and the formula α(k)(a) to infer β(k)(a), and provide this formula to
the controller. This is an event of Type 2.
Let Bt∗ be the most recent belief set, i.e., either it is Bt+1 or it is the belief set that
has resulted from the processes associated with the indicated events of Type 2, if any
occurred. If the input formula α(k)(a) is still active, search Bt∗ for any active formulas
having the form (∀x)(α(k)(x) → β(p)(x)), where α is the predicate symbol of the input
formula. For each such formula, apply Aristotelian Syllogism to this and the formula
α(k)(a) to infer β(p)(a), and provide this formula to the controller. This is an event of
Type 3.
LetBt∗ be the most recent belief set, i.e., either it isBt+1 or it is the belief set that has
resulted from the processes associated with the indicated events of Type 2 and/or Type
3, if any occurred. If the input formula α(k)(a) is still active, search Bt∗ for any active
formulas having the form (∀x)(α(k)(x)→ ¬β(p)(x)), where α is the predicate symbol of
the input formula. For each such formula, apply Aristotelian Syllogism to this and the
formula α(k)(a) to infer ¬β(p)(a), and provide this formula to the controller. This is an
event of Type 4.
Event Type 2: A formula of the form α(k)(a) is provided to the controller as a result
of an inference rule application (Aristotelian Syllogism). In this case, both α(k) and a
are already in Lt, so let Lt+1 = Lt. Form Bt+1 from Bt by (i) adding the labeled formula
(α(k)(a), {t + 1, F, ∅, bel , 0.5, a posteriori}), where the from-list F contains the name of
the inference rule that was used to infer α(k)(a) (Aristotelian Syllogism), together with
the indexes of the formulas that served as premises in the rule application, and (ii)
updating the to-lists of all formulas that thus served as premises by including the
index t + 1. Let Ht+1 = Ht. Note that no modification of the hierarchy is warranted,
since the membership of the object associated with a in the category associated with
α(k) is already implicit in the hierarchy, so that a link between the respective nodes
would form a redundant path.
Search Bt+1 for any active formulas having the form (∀x)(α(k)(x) → β(k)(x)), where
α(k) is the predicate symbol of the above derived formula. For each such formula, apply
Aristotelian Syllogism to this and the formula α(k)(a) to infer β(k)(a), and provide this
formula to the controller. This is a recursive occurrence of an event of Type 2.
Let Bt∗ be the most recent belief set, i.e., either it is Bt+1 or it is the belief set that
has resulted from the processes associated with the indicated events of Type 2, if any
occurred. If the input formula α(k)(a) is still active, search Bt∗ for any active formulas
having the form (∀x)(α(k)(x) → β(p)(x)), where α is the predicate symbol of the input
formula. For each such formula, apply Aristotelian Syllogism to this and the formula
α(k)(a) to infer β(p)(a), and provide this formula to the controller. This is an event of
Type 3.
LetBt∗ be the most recent belief set, i.e., either it isBt+1 or it is the belief set that has
resulted from the processes associated with the indicated events of Type 3 and/or Type
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4, if any occurred. If the input formula α(k)(a) is still active, search Bt∗ for any active
formulas having the form (∀x)(α(k)(x)→ ¬β(p)(x)), where α is the predicate symbol of
the input formula. For each such formula, apply Aristotelian Syllogism to this and the
formula α(k)(a) to infer ¬β(p)(a), and provide this formula to the controller. This is an
event of Type 4.
Event Type 3: A formula of the form α(p)(a) is provided to the controller as a result
of an inference rule application (Aristotelian Syllogism). Search the current hierarchy
Ht for the most specific occurrence (relative to the given occurrence of α(p)(a)) in a
formula containing α(p) (i.e., either it is an occurrence of α(p) or of ¬α(p)). If this most
specific occurrence is an occurrence of ¬α(p), let Lt+1 = Lt, Bt+1 = Bt, and Ht+1 = Ht.
This amounts to invoking the specificity principle to block an inheritance. If this most
specific occurrence is an occurrence of α(p)(a), the formula being input already resides
in the current belief set, and again one can let Lt+1 = Lt, Bt+1 = Bt, and Ht+1 = Ht.
Otherwise, do the following. Let Lt+1 = Lt. Form Bt+1 from Bt by (i) adding the la-
belled formula (α(p)(a), {t+1, F, ∅, bel , 0.5, a posteriori}), where the from-list F contains
the name of the inference rule that was used to infer α(p)(a) (Aristotelian Syllogism),
together with the indexes of the formulas that served as premises in the rule appli-
cation, and (ii) updating the to-lists of all formulas that thus served as premises by
including the index t+ 1. Let Ht+1 = Ht.
Search Bt+1 for an active occurrence of the formula ¬α(p)(a), where α(p)(a) is the
input formula, and, if found, apply Contradiction Detection to infer ⊥ and provide this
formula to the controller. This is an event of Type 5. If α(p)(a) is still active, repeat
the foregoing. Keep doing this until either α(p)(a) becomes inactive (disbelieved) or no
further occurrences of ¬α(p)(a) are found.
Event Type 4: A formula of the form ¬α(p)(a) is provided to the controller as a result
of an inference rule application (Aristotelian Syllogism). Search the current hierarchy
Ht for the most specific occurrence (relative to the given occurrence of ¬α(p)(a)) of a
formula containing α(p) (i.e., either it is an occurrence of α(p) or of ¬α(p) ). If this most
specific occurrence is an occurrence of α(p), let Lt+1 = Lt, Bt+1 = Bt, and Ht+1 = Ht.
This amounts to invoking the specificity principle to block an inheritance. If this most
specific occurrence is an occurrence of ¬α(p), the formula being input already resides
in the current belief set, and again one can let Lt+1 = Lt, Bt+1 = Bt, and Ht+1 = Ht.
Otherwise, do the following. Let Lt+1 = Lt. Form Bt+1 from Bt by (i) adding the labeled
formula (¬α(p)(a), {t + 1, F, ∅, bel , 0.5, a posteriori}), where the from-list F contains the
name of the inference rule that was used to infer ¬α(p)(a) (Aristotelian Syllogism), to-
gether with the indexes of the formulas that served as premises in the rule application,
and (ii) updating the to-lists of all formulas that thus served as premises by including
the index t+ 1. Let Ht+1 = Ht.
Search Bt+1 for an active occurrence of the formula α(p)(a), where ¬α(p)(a) is the
input formula, and, if found, apply Contradiction Detection to infer ⊥ and provide this
formula to the controller. This is an event of Type 5. If ¬α(p)(a) is still active, repeat
the foregoing. Keep doing this until either ¬α(p)(a) becomes inactive (disbelieved) or
no further occurrences of α(p)(a) are found.
Event Type 5: The formula ⊥ is provided to the controller as the result of an ap-
plication of Contradiction Detection. Let Lt+1 = Lt. Form Bt+1 from Bt by (i) adding
the labeled formula (⊥, {t+1, F, ∅, bel , 0.5, a posteriori}), where the from-list F contains
the name of the inference rule (Contradiction Detection) that was used to conclude this
occurrence of ⊥, together with the indexes of the formulas that served as premises in
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the rule application, and (ii) updating the to-lists of all formulas that thus served as
premises by including the index t+ 1. Let Ht+1 = Ht.
Now invoke the Dialectical Belief Revision algorithm on Bt+1 as described in Sec-
tion 2.2, starting with the formula ⊥ just added to the belief set. As a result of this
process, some formulas in the current belief set will have their status changed from
bel to disbel. Let Bt+2 be the belief set obtained from Bt+1 by making these changes
in the relevant formulas’ labels. Let Lt+2 = Lt+1. Obtain Ht+2 from Ht+1 by removing
any elements representing formulas whose statuses have thus been changed to disbel.
Specifically, (i) if a formula of the form α(k)(a) is disbelieved, remove the object-kind
link connecting the node representing a to the node representing α(k), and remove the
node representing a, unless it is connected to some node other than the one represent-
ing α(k), and (ii) if a formula of the form (∀x)(α(k)(x)→ β(k)(x)) is disbelieved, remove
the subkind-kind link connecting the node representing α(k) to the node representing
β(k), and remove the node representing α(k), unless it is connected to some node other
than the one representing β(k).
Event Type 6: A formula of the form (∀x)(α(k)(x)→ β(k)(x)) is provided to the con-
troller by a human user. If both α(k) and β(k) are already in Lt, begin by performing as
many as possible of the following two actions. First, explore all ancestors of α(k) to see
if they include β(k), and, if so, reject the input and inform the user that the input is
disallowed inasmuch as it would create a redundant path in the subsumption hierar-
chy. Second, explore all ancestors of β(k) as expressed by formulas in Bt to determine
whether these include α(k), and, if so, reject the input and inform the user that the
input is disallowed inasmuch as it would create a loop in the subsumption hierarchy.
If the input is not rejected for either of these reasons, do the following.
If either α(k) or β(k) is not in the symbol set for Lt, form Lt+1 by adding the ones that
are missing, otherwise let Lt+1 = Lt. Form Bt+1 from Bt by adding the labeled formula
((∀x)(α(k)(x) → β(k)(x)), {t + 1, {hu}, ∅, bel , 0.5, a posteriori}). If there are no nodes rep-
resenting either α(k) or β(k) in Ht, form Ht+1 by adding such nodes together with a
subkind-kind link from the α(k) node to the β(k) node. If one of α(k) and β(k) is repre-
sented by a node in Ht but the other is not, form Ht+1 by adding a node representing
the one that is missing together with a subkind-kind link from the α(k) node to the
β(k) node. If both α(k) and β(k) are represented by nodes in Ht, form Ht+1 by adding a
subkind-kind link from the α(k) node to the β(k) node.
Now search Bt+1 for any active formulas of the form α(k)(a) where α(k) is the pred-
icate symbol in the input formula, and, for each such formula, apply Aristotelian Syl-
logism to infer β(k)(a), and provide this to the controller. This is an event of Type 2.
Event Type 7: A formula of the form (∀x)(α(k)(x)→ β(p)(x)) is provided to the con-
troller by a human user. If either α(k) or β(p) is not in the symbol set for Lt, form Lt+1
by adding the ones that are missing, otherwise let Lt+1 = Lt. Form Bt+1 from Bt by
adding the labeled formula ((∀x)(α(k)(x)→ β(p)(x)), {t+1, {hu}, ∅, bel , 0.5, a posteriori}).
If the occurrence of β(p) in this formula is the n-th occurrence of this predicate symbol
in the current derivation path, affix this occurrence with the extralogical subscript n
to serve as an occurrence index. If there are no nodes representing either α(k) or β(p) in
Ht, form Ht+1 by adding such nodes (including the occurrence index on β(p)) together
with a has-property link from the α(k) node to the β(p) node. If one of α(k) and β(p) is
represented by a node in Ht but the other is not, form Ht+1 by adding a node repre-
senting the one that is missing together with a has-property link from the α(k) node to
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the β(p) node. If both α(k) and β(p) are represented by nodes in Ht, form Ht+1 by adding
a has-property link from the α(k) node to the β(p) node.
Now search Bt+1 for any active formulas of the form α(k)(a) where α(k) is the pred-
icate symbol in the input formula, and, for each such formula, apply Aristotelian Syl-
logism to infer β(p)(a), and provide this to the controller. This is an event of Type 3.
Event Type 8: A formula of the form (∀x)(α(k)(x)→ ¬β(p)(x)) is provided to the con-
troller by a human user. If either α(k) or β(p) is not in the symbol set for Lt, form Lt+1 by
adding the ones that are missing, otherwise let Lt+1 = Lt. FormBt+1 fromBt by adding
the labeled formula ((∀x)(α(k)(x)→ ¬β(p)(x)), {t+1, {hu}, ∅, bel , 0.5, a posteriori}). If the
occurrence of β(p) in this formula is the n-th occurrence of this predicate symbol in the
current derivation path, affix this occurrence with the extralogical subscript n to serve
as an occurrence index. If there are no nodes representing either α(k) or ¬β(p) in Ht,
form Ht+1 by adding such nodes (including the occurrence index on β(p)) together with
a has-property link from the α(k) node to the ¬β(p) node. If one of α(k) and ¬β(p) is rep-
resented by a node in Ht but the other is not, form Ht+1 by adding a node representing
the one that is missing together with a has-property link from the α(k) node to the
¬β(p) node. If both α(k) and ¬β(p) are represented by nodes in Ht, form Ht+1 by adding
a has-property link from the α(k) node to the ¬β(p) node.
Now search Bt+1 for any active formulas of the form α(k)(a) where α(k) is the pred-
icate symbol in the input formula, and, for each such formula, apply Aristotelian Syl-
logism to infer ¬β(p)(a), and provide this to the controller. This is an event of Type 4.
We now turn to the task of establishing saliency and correctness for an arbitrary
MIS. This entails proving appropriate analogs of Proposition 14 and Theorems 5, 6,
and 7.
Proposition 5.1. Every MIS is a normal DRS.
5.2. Illustration 1
Some of the algorithms associated with the foregoing events can be illustrated by
considering the inputs needed to create the inheritance hierarchy shown in Figure
5.1. This focuses on the process of property inheritance with exceptions. Let us ab-
breviate ‘Bird’, ‘Penguin’, and ‘CanFly’, respectively, by ‘B’, ‘P’, and ‘CF’. In accor-
dance with the definition of derivation path in Section 2.1, the language L0 will be
the language generated by the logical symbols given in Section 3.1, i.e., by σ0 =
{x1,x2, . . . , ‘,’, ‘(’, ‘)’,¬,∨,∀,⊥}. This means that the only formula in L0 is ⊥. Also in
accordance with the Section 2.1, belief set B0 = ∅. In accordance with the definition of
an MIS, set H0 = ∅.
Consider an input of the first formula in the foregoing list, namely, (∀x)(P(k)(x) →
B(k)(x)). This is an event of Type 6. The language L1 is formed from L0 by adding
the symbols P(k) and B(k) (or, more exactly, the predicate letters A(k)2 and A
(k)
1 ), i.e.,
σ1 = σ0∪{P(k),B(k)}. The belief set B1 is formed from B0 by adding the labeled formula
((∀x)(P(k)(x) → B(k)(x)), {1, {hu}, ∅, bel , 0.5, a posteriori}). The hierarchy H1 is formed
from H0 by adding the nodes P(k), B(k) and the subkind-kind link (P(k),B(k)).
Consider an input of the second formula in the list, namely, (∀x)(B(k)(x)→ CF(p)1 (x)).
This is an event of Type 7. The language L2 is formed from L1 by adding the
symbol CF(p) (or, more exactly, the predicate letter A(p)1 ), i.e., σ2 = σ1 ∪ {CF(p)}.
The belief set B2 is formed from B1 by adding the labeled formula ((∀x)(B(k)(x) →
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CF
(p)
1 (x)), {2, {hu}, ∅, bel , 0.5, a posteriori}), here including the extralogical occurrence
index on CF(p). The hierarchy H2 is formed from H1 by adding the node CF
(p)
1 and the
has-property link (B(k),CF(p)1 ) (again adding the extralogical subscript).
Consider an input of (∀x)(P(k)(x) → ¬CF(p)2 (x)). This is an event of Type 8. The
language L3 is set equal to L2. The belief set B3 is formed from B2 by adding the
labeled formula ((∀x)(P(k)(x)→ ¬CF(p)2 (x)), {3, {hu}, ∅, bel , 0.5, a posteriori}), including
the extralogical occurrence on CF(p) as before. The hierarchy H3 is formed from H2 by
adding the node ¬CF(p)2 and the has-property link (B(k),¬CF(p)2 ).
Consider an input of B(k)(Tweety). This is an event of Type 1. The language
L4 is formed from L3 by adding the symbol Tweety (or, more exactly, the individ-
ual constant a1). The belief set B4 is formed from B3 by adding the labeled for-
mula (B(k)(Tweety), {4, {hu}, ∅, bel , 0.5, a posteriori}). The hierarchy H4 is formed from
H3 by adding the node Tweety and the object-kind link (Tweety,B(k)). The algo-
rithm for Event Type 1 then proceeds to apply Aristotelian Syllogism to B(k)(Tweety)
and the previously input formula (∀x)(B(k)(x) → CF(p)1 (x)) to infer CF(p)1 (Tweety))
and provide this to the controller. This is an event of Type 3. The algorithm
for Event Type 3 (i) sets L5 = L4, (ii) forms B5 from B4 by adding the la-
beled formula (CF(p)1 (Tweety), {5, F, ∅, bel , 0.5, a posteriori}), where the from-list F ={AristotelianSyllogism, 4, 2}, and changes the to-lists of formulas 4 and 2 from ∅ to {5},
and (iii) sets H5 = H4.
Consider an input of P(k)(Opus). This is an event of Type 1. The language
L6 is formed from L5 by adding the symbol Opus (or, more exactly, the indi-
vidual constant a2). The belief set B6 is formed from B5 by adding the labeled
formula (P(k)(Opus), {6, {hu}, ∅, bel , 0.5, a posteriori}). The hierarchy H6 is formed
from H5 by adding the node Opus and the object-kind link (Opus,P(k)). The algo-
rithm for Event Type 1 then proceeds to apply Aristotelian Syllogism to P(k)(Opus)
and the previously input formula (∀x)(P(k)(x) → B(k)(x)) to infer B(k)(Opus))
and provide this to the controller. This is an event of Type 2. The algorithm
for Event Type 2 (i) sets L7 = L6, (ii) forms B7 from B6 by adding the la-
beled formula (B(k)(Opus), {7, F, ∅, bel , 0.5, a posteriori}), where the from-list F =
{AristotelianSyllogism, 6, 1}, and changes the to-lists of formulas 6 and 1 from ∅ to {7},
and (iii) sets H7 = H6.
The algorithm for Event Type 2 then continues by applying Aristotelian Syllogism
to the inferred formula B(k)(Opus) and the previously input formula (∀x)(B(k)(x) →
CF
(p)
1 (x)) to infer CF
(p)
1 (Opus) and provides this formula to the controller. This is
an event of Type 3. Since there is a more specific occurrence of CF in the formula
¬CF(p)2 (x), namely, the newly derived formula is not entered into the belief set, giving
L8 = L7, B8 = B7, and H8 = H7.
So far the process has invoked Event Type 1, which led to an invocation of
Event Type 2, which led to an invocation of Event Type 3. The Event Type 3 al-
gorithm has now terminated, which effectively has also terminated the Event Type
2 algorithm, sending the flow of control back to where it left off in the Event
Type 1 algorithm. This algorithm then proceeds to apply Aristotelian Syllogism
to the input formula P(k)(Opus) and the previously input formula (∀x)(B(k)(x) →
¬CF(p)2 (x)) to infer ¬CF(p)2 (Opus) and provide this formula to the controller. This
is an event of Type 4. Because this formula contains the most specific occurrence
of CF, the algorithm (i) sets L9 = L8, (ii) forms B9 from B8 by adding the la-
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beled formula (¬CF(p)2 (Opus), {9, F, ∅, bel , 0.5, a posteriori}), where the from-list F ={AristotelianSyllogism, 6, 3}, changes the to-list of formula 6 from {7} to {7, 9} and to-list
of formula 3 from ∅ to {9}, and (iii) sets H7 = H6.
Thus is is seen that, in this example, the algorithms serve to derive all salient infor-
mation, i.e., all formulas of the forms α(k)(a), α(p)(a), and α(p)(a) that are implicit in the
graph, while at the same time correctly enforcing the specificity principle.
5.3. Illustration 2
This considers the application of contradiction detection. The classic Nixon Diamond
puzzle (cf. [36]) is shown in Figure 5.3. Here a contradiction arises because, by the
reasoning portrayed on the left side, Nixon is a pacifist, whereas, by the reasoning
portrayed on the right, he is not. The resolution of this puzzle in the context of an MIS
can be described in terms of the multiple inheritance hierarchy shown in Figure 5.4.
Nixon
Pacifist
Quaker Republican
Is−a Is−a
Is−a Is−not−a
Figure 5.3. Nixon Diamond, original version.
Nixon
Quaker(k) Republican(k) ¬Pacifist(p)2Pacifist(p)1
Figure 5.4. Nixon Diamond as an MIS.
The links in Figure 5.4 represent the formulas
(∀x)(Quaker(k)(x)→ Pacifist(p)1 (x))
(∀x)(Republican(k)(x)→ ¬Pacifist(p)2 (x))
Quaker(k)(Nixon)
Republican(k)(Nixon)
ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems, Vol. 0, No. 0, Article 0, Publication date: 0000.
Dynamic Reasoning Systems 0:35
The action of the algorithms may be traced similarly as in Illustration 1. Let
‘Quaker’, ‘Republican’ and ‘Pacifist’ denote the predicate symbols A(k)1 , A
(k)
2 and A
(p)
1 ,
and abbreviate these by ‘Q’, ‘R’ and ‘P’. Let ‘Nixon’ denote the individual constant a1.
In accordance with the definition of derivation path in Section 2.1, the language L0
will be the language generated by the logical symbols given in Section 3.1, i.e., by
σ0 = {x1,x2, . . . , ‘,’, ‘(’, ‘)’,¬,∨,∀,⊥}. This means that the only formula in L0 is ⊥. Also
in accordance with the Section 2.1, belief set B0 = ∅. In accordance with the definition
of an MIS, set H0 = ∅.
Consider an input of (∀x)(Q(k)(x) → P(p)1 (x)). This is an event of Type 7. The lan-
guage L1 is formed from L0 by adding the symbols Q(k) and P(p) (or, more exactly, the
predicate letters A(k)1 and A
(p)
1 ), i.e., σ1 = σ0 ∪ {Q(k),P(p)}. The belief set B1 is formed
from B0 by adding the labeled formula ((∀x)(Q(k)(x) → P(p)1 (x)), {1, {hu}, ∅, bel , 0.5,
a posteriori}), here including the extralogical occurrence index on P(p). The hierarchy
H1 is formed from H0 by adding the nodes Q
(k)
1 and P
(p)
1 and the has-property link
(Q(k),P
(p)
1 ).
Consider an input of (∀x)(R(k)(x) → ¬P(p)1 (x)). This is an event of Type 8. The lan-
guage L2 is formed from L1 by adding the symbol R(k) (or, more exactly, the predicate
letter A(k)2 ), i.e., σ1 = σ0 ∪ {R(k)}. The belief set B2 is formed from B1 by adding the
labeled formula ((∀x)(R(k)(x)→ ¬P(p)2 (x)), {2, {hu}, ∅, bel , 0.5, a posteriori}), here again
including the extralogical occurrence index on P(p). The hierarchy H2 is formed from
H1 by adding the node ¬P(p)2 and the has-property link (R(k),P(p)2 ).
Consider an input of Q(k)(Nixon). This is an event of Type 1. The language
L3 is formed from L2 by adding the symbol Nixon (or, more exactly, the individ-
ual constant a1). The belief set B3 is formed from B2 by adding the labeled for-
mula (Q(k)(Nixon), {3, {hu}, ∅, bel , 0.5, a posteriori}). The hierarchy H3 is formed from
H2 by adding the node Nixon and the object-kind link (Nixon,Q(k)). The algo-
rithm for Event Type 1 then proceeds to apply Aristotelian Syllogism to Q(k)(Nixon)
and the previously input formula (∀x)(Q(k)(x) → P(p)1 (x)) to infer P(p)1 (Nixon)
and provide this to the controller. This is an event of Type 3. The algorithm
for Event Type 3 (i) sets L4 = L3, (ii) forms B4 from B3 by adding the la-
beled formula (P(p)1 (Nixon), {4, F, ∅, bel , 0.5, a posteriori}), where the from-list F ={AristotelianSyllogism, 3, 1}, and changes the to-lists of formulas 3 and 1 from ∅ to {4},
and (iii) sets H4 = H3. The algorithm for Event Type 3 then proceeds to scan the cur-
rent belief set B4 for any active occurrences of ¬P(p)(Nixon) (ignoring the extralogical
occurrence indexes) and doesn’t find any.
Consider an input of R(k)(Nixon). This is an event of Type 1. This sets L5 = L4
and H5 = H4. The belief set B5 is formed from B4 by adding the labeled formula
(R(k)(Nixon), {5, {hu}, ∅, bel , 0.5, a posteriori}). The algorithm for Event Type 1 then
proceeds to apply Aristotelian Syllogism to R(k)(Nixon) and the previously input for-
mula (∀x)(R(k)(x) → ¬P(p)1 (x)) to infer ¬P(p)2 (Nixon) and provide this to the controller.
This is an event of Type 4. The algorithm for Event Type 4 (i) sets L6 = L5, (ii) forms
B6 from B5 by adding the labeled formula (¬P(p)2 (Nixon), {6, F, ∅, bel , 0.5, a pos- teriori}),
where the from-list F = {AristotelianSyllogism, 5, 2}, and changes the to-lists of formu-
las 5 and 2 from ∅ to {6}, and (iii) sets H6 = H5. The algorithm for Event Type 4 then
proceeds to scan the current belief set B6 for any active occurrences of P(p)(Nixon) and
finds the formula with index 4. This triggers an application of Contradiction Detec-
tion, which derives ⊥ and provides this to the controller. This is an event of Type 5.
ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems, Vol. 0, No. 0, Article 0, Publication date: 0000.
0:36 D.G. Schwartz
This sets L7 = L6 and H7 = H6. B7 is formed from B6 by adding the labeled formula
(⊥, {7, F, ∅, bel , 0.5, a posteriori}), where the from-list F = {ContradictionDetection, 6, 4},
and changes the to-lists of formulas 6 and 4 from ∅ to {7}.
Then Dialectical Belief Revision is invoked. All the formulas that were input by the
user are candidates for belief change. Suppose that the formula with index 2, namely,
(∀x)(R(k)(x) → ¬P(p)2 (x)), is chosen. Then the procedure forward chains through to
lists, starting with this formula, and changes to disbel the status first of formula 6,
¬P(p)2 (Nixon), and then of formula 7, ⊥. This results in L8 = L7, B8 is the belief set
obtained fromB7 by making the three indicated belief status changes, andH8 is formed
from H7 by removing the links (Nixon,R(k)) and (R(k),¬P(p)2 ), leaving only the left side
of the hierarchy in Figure 5.4.
Further well-known puzzles that can be resolved similarly within an MIS are the
others discussed in [27], namely, Bosco the Blue Whale [34], Suzie the Platypus[34],
Clyde the Royal Elephant [36], and Expanded Nixon Diamond [36],
5.4. Saliency
That an MIS controller produces all relevant salient information as prescribed above
can be summarized as a pair of theorems.
Theorem 5.1. The foregoing algorithms serve to maintain the hierarchy with re-
spect to the object and kind nodes as a directed acyclic graph without redundant links.
Thus leaf nodes will be either object nodes or kind nodes that have no assigned
objects. If an object is linked to some kind node, it is not directly linked to any ancestors
of that kind node; and no kind node is directly linked to any of its ancestors other than
its parents. This makes the hierarchy useful for visualization and browsing.
In addition, the algorithms ensure that the belief set will contain explicit repre-
sentation of all and only the object-kind classifications implicit in the hierarchy. This
amounts to the following.
Theorem 5.2. After any process initiated by a user input terminates, the resulting
belief set will contain a formula of the form α(k)(a) or α(p)(a) or ¬α(p)(a) iff the formula
is derivable from the formulas corresponding to links in the inheritance hierarchy,
observing the specificity principle.
5.5. Correctness
It is desired to establish the analog of Theorem 7 for the MIS DRS. Here the concern
is with maintaining consistency with respect to all formulas except those expressing
that the elements of a kind have some property, since inconsistencies among these are
allowed.
Theorem 5.3. For any derivation path in an MIS, the belief set that results at the
conclusion of a process initiated by a user input will be consistent with respect to the
formulas of the forms α(k)(a), (∀x)(α(k)(x)→ β(p)(x)), and α(p)(a).
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This work has introduced a computational framework for nonmonotonic belief revision.
The treatment has employed classical first-order predicate calculus as the underlying
reasoning system, but the DRS framework can accommodate virtually any well-defined
logic. In each of the examples given, an application-specific controller was provided and
proven to be adequate and correct for the intended application. These proofs required
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that the logic have a well-defined semantics and be sound with respect to that seman-
tics. While it is difficult to speculate about further applications, it seems likely that
such typically will be necessary and sufficient. In any case, semantic completeness of
the logic does not seem to be required.
There are several issues regarding this work that remain to be explored. First, the
formula labels considered herein have included a place for an epistemic entrenchment
value, but these not been employed in the present examples, although it certainly
would be possible to do so. These could be used to remove the human from the loop
when undergoing Dialectical Belief Revision, by using such values to automatically
choose what extralogical axioms to disbelieve. At issue, however, is how to determine
exactly what should be the epistemic entrenchment value for any given formula. No
systematic methods for doing so currently exist.
Second, computational complexity of the controller algorithms is another issue.
Clearly, this must be studied for each different controller; there can be no general
statements regarding this. For the examples considered in this paper, however, the
complexity seems manageable.
Third, the previous work [27] developed a ‘logic for qualified syllogisms’ and applied
this to resolve the same nonmonotonic puzzles discussed in the foregoing. That work
did not consider a controller, however, and it is an open question how a suitable one
might be devised. Doing so would require further developing the logic and providing a
soundness result.
Last, the present work has provided all the precise mathematical details necessary
for a software implementation. Developing such an implementation would be a sub-
stantial undertaking, however, and before doing so it would be warranted to demon-
strate that the DRS can be employed in practical real-world applications. The present
work has provided toy applications to illustrate the core ideas, but the prospect for
substantive real-world applications has yet to be explored.
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This appendix contains the proofs of all proposition and theorems.
Proposition 3.1. For any DRS, Dialectical Belief Revision is normal.
Proof. Suppose that Bt′ is obtained from Bt by an application of Dialectical Belief
Revision. This involves changing the status of some formulas in Bt from bel to disbel.
The issue is whether this might create ‘orphan’ formulas whose status remain bel even
though some formulas used in their derivations are now changed to disbel, i.e., so that
their derivations are no longer valid, and they are no longer theorems. Inspection of
the Dialectical Belief Revision algorithm as defined in Section 2.2 makes it evident
that this situation cannot occur. In this process, the first formulas whose statuses are
changed to disbel are extralogical axioms, and the process proceeds by following to-
lists starting with these formulas and changing to disbel the status of all (and only)
the formulas whose derivations depended on these. Thus no such ‘orphan’ formulas
can arise. 
Proposition 3.2. In a normal DRS, for each theory Tt determined by a pair (Lt, Bt)
in a derivation path for the DRS, the active formulas in Bt will be theorems of Tt.
Proof. This is established by induction on the length t of derivation paths. For the
base step with t = 0, Bt = ∅ by definition of derivation path. So all formulas in Bt are
theorems of Tt by default. For the induction step with t ≥ 0, the induction hypothesis
is that the formulas in Bt are theorems of Tt, and it is required to show that, given this
hypothesis, the formulas in Bt+1 must be theorems of Tt+1.
Consider the five ways of forming Bt+1 from Bt prescribed in the definition of deriva-
tion path. Item 1: A logical axiom is added. Logical axioms are theorems of Tt+1, by
definition of theorem. Item 2: A formula is added as the derived conclusion of an infer-
ence rule application, where the premises of the application are in Bt and are therefore
theorems by the induction hypothesis. Then the derived formula is a theorem of Tt+1,
by definition of theorem. Item 3: An extralogical axiom is added. An extralogical axiom
of Tt+1 is a theorem of Tt+1, by definition of theorem. Item 4: This also is addition of an
extralogical axiom; so the argument for Item 3 applies. Item 5: Bt+1 is obtained from
Bt by an application of belief revision algorithm. Then the active formulas in Bt+1 are
theorems of Tt+1, by definition of normal DRS. This completes the induction step and
concludes the proof by induction on t. 
Proposition 3.3. Let Tt be the theory determined by an entry (Lt, Bt) in the deriva-
tion path for a normal DRS, let T be the theory with language Lt and no extralogical
axioms, and let Γ be the set of active formulas in Bt. Then, for any formula P of Lt,
Tt ` P iff T (Γ) ` P .
Proof. Given the assumptions, suppose that Tt ` P . By definition of Tt, the extralog-
ical axioms of Tt comprise a subset of Γ, so it follows by the definition of theorem that
T (Γ) ` P .
Theorem 3.1. (Soundness Theorem for PC) For any theory T , if TPC ` P , then P is
a tautology.
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Proof. This is Proposition 2.14 in [14] and Proposition 1.11 in [22]. The theorem is
established by induction on the length of proofs P1, . . . , Pn in TPC. The base step, for
n = 1, amounts to verifying that all instances of axioms schemas (S1), (S2), and (S3)
are tautologies. The induction step, for n > 1, amounts to showing that Modus Ponens
preserves tautologousness, i.e., if P and P → Q are tautologies, then Q is a tautology.

Theorem 3.2. (Adequacy Theorem for PC) For any theory T , if P is a tautology, then
TPC ` P .
Proof. This is Proposition 2.23 in [14] and Proposition 1.13 in [22]. 
These theorems can be used to show that axiom schema (S4) serves merely as a
defining axiom for⊥ and does not enable proving any additional formulas not involving
⊥. Let TPC(⊥) ` P indicate that P has a proof in T using only (S1), (S2), (S3), and (S4),
Schema Instantiation 1, and Modus Ponens.
Proposition 3.4. If P does not contain any occurrences of ⊥ and TPC(⊥) ` P , then
TPC ` P .
Proof. This can be established by showing that the proof of Theorem 3.1 can be mod-
ified to show that, if TPC(⊥) ` P , then P is a tautology. For then, if P does not contain
any occurrences of ⊥, we have TPC ` P , by Theorem 3.2. The necessary modification
of Theorem 1 amounts to augmenting the base step by showing that all instances of
axiom schema (S4) are tautologies. 
Proposition 3.5. The above seven inference rules are valid in any theory T .
Proof. Hypothetical Syllogism is Corollary 2.10 of [14] and Corollary 1.9.(a) of [22].
In the following, T ` is shortened to `.
Aristotelian Syllogism can be derived as follows:
` (∀x)(P → Q) (assumption) (1)
` P (a/x) (assumption) (2)
` (∀x)(P → Q)→ (P → Q)(a/x) (Schema Instantiation 2) (3)
` (P → Q)(a/x) (1, 3, and Modus Ponens) (4)
` P (a/x)→ Q(a/x) (4 and definition of notation (a/x)) (5)
` Q(a/x) (2, 5, and Modus Ponens)
A derivation of Subsumption is:
` (∀x)(α(x)→ β(x)) (assumption) (1)
` (∀x)(β(x)→ γ(x)) (assumption) (2)
` (∀x)(α(x)→ β(x))→ (α(x)→ β(x)) (Schema Instantiation 2 with x for t) (3)
` (∀x)(β(x)→ γ(x))→ (β(x)→ γ(x)) (Schema Instantiation 2 with x for t) (4)
` α(x)→ β(x) (1, 3, and Modus Ponens) (5)
` β(x)→ γ(x) (2, 4, and Modus Ponens) (6)
` α(x)→ γ(x) (4, 6, and Hypothetical Syllogism) (7)
` (∀x)(α(x)→ γ(x)) (7 and Generalization)
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And-Introduction can be established by:
` P (assumption) (1)
` Q (assumption) (2)
` P → (Q→ P ∧Q) (Exercise 1.46(h) of [22]) (3)
` Q→ P ∧Q (1, 3, and Modus Ponens) (4)
` P ∧Q (2, 4, and Modus Ponens)
And-Elimination can be derived as follows:
` P ∧Q (assumption) (1)
` ¬(P → ¬Q) (1 and definition of ∧) (2)
` (¬P → (P → ¬Q))→ (¬(P → ¬Q)→ ¬¬P ) (Lemma 1.10.e of [22]) (3)
` ¬P → (P → ¬Q) (Lemma 1.10.c of [22]) (4)
` ¬(P → ¬Q)→ ¬¬P (3, 4, and Modus Ponens) (5)
` ¬¬P → P (Lemma 1.10.a of [22]) (6)
` ¬(P → ¬Q)→ P (5, 6, and Hypothetical Syllogism) (7)
` P (2, 7, and Modus Ponens) (8)
` (¬Q→ (P → ¬Q))→ (¬(P → ¬Q)→ ¬¬Q) (Lemma 1.10.e of [22]) (9)
` (¬Q→ (P → ¬Q)) ((S1) and Schema Instantiation 1) (10)
` ¬(P → ¬Q)→ ¬¬Q (9, 10, and Modus Ponens) (11)
` ¬¬Q→ Q (Lemma 1.10.a of [22]) (12)
` ¬(P → ¬Q)→ Q (11, 12, and Hypothetical Syllogism) (13)
` Q (2, 13, and Modus Ponens)
Items 8 and 13 together give the And-Elimination rule.
A derivation of Conflict Detection is:
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` (∀x)¬(P ∧Q) (assumption) (1)
` P (a/x) (assumption) (2)
` Q(a/x) (assumption) (3)
` (∀x)¬(P ∧Q)→ (¬(P ∧Q))(a/x) (Schema Instantiation 2) (4)
` (¬(P ∧Q))(a/x) (1, 4, and Modus Ponens) (5)
` P (a/x) ∧Q(a/x) (2, 3, and And-Introduction) (6)
` (P ∧Q)(a/x) (6 and definition of (t/x)) (7)
` (P ∧Q)(a/x) ∧ (¬(P ∧Q))(a/x) (5, 7, and And-Introduction) (8)
` ¬(P (a/x) ∧Q(a/x)) (5 and definition of (t/x)) (9)
` ⊥ ↔ (P (a/x) ∧Q(a/x)) ∧ ¬(P (a/x) ∧Q(a/x)) ((S4) and Sch. Instantiation 1) (10)
` (⊥ → (P (a/x) ∧Q(a/x)) ∧ ¬(P (a/x) ∧Q(a/x)))∧
((P (a/x) ∧Q(a/x)) ∧ ¬(P (a/x) ∧Q(a/x))→ ⊥) (10 and definition of↔) (11)
` (P (a/x) ∧Q(a/x)) ∧ ¬(P (a/x) ∧Q(a/x))→ ⊥ (11 and And-Elimination) (12)
` (P ∧Q)(a/x) ∧ (¬(P ∧Q))(a/x)→ ⊥ (12 and definition of (t/x)) (13)
` ⊥ (8, 13, and Modus Ponens)
Contradiction Detection can be derived as follows:
` P (assumption) (1)
` ¬P (assumption) (2)
` P ∧ ¬P (1, 2, and And Introduction) (3)
` ⊥ ↔ P ∧ ¬P (S4 and Schema Instantiation 1) (4)
` (⊥ → P ∧ ¬P ) ∧ (P ∧ ¬P → ⊥) (definition of↔) (5)
` P ∧ ¬P → ⊥ (5 and And Elimination) (6)
` ⊥ (2, 5, and Modus Ponens)
This completes the proof. 
Proposition 3.6. A theory T is consistent iff there is a formula P of LT such that
T 6 ` P .
Proof. This is Proposition 2.18 in [14]. 
Proposition 3.7. For an entry (Lt, Bt) in the derivation path of a normal DRS, Bt is
consistent if and only if the theory Tt determined by (Lt, Bt) is consistent.
Proof. Let T be the theory with language Lt and no extralogical axioms, and let Γ be
the active formulas in Bt. Note that Bt is consistent if and only if T (Γ) is consistent, by
definition of consistent for Bt. By Proposition 3.3, T (Γ) and Tt have the same theorems,
in which case T (Γ) is consistent if and only if Tt is consistent. Thus Bt is consistent if
and only if Tt is consistent. 
Proposition 3.8. Let P be a formula of LT in which no individual variable other
than x occurs free, let a be an individual constant of LT , let I be an interpretation of
LT , and let d = I(a). Then I |= P (a/x) iff I |= P (dˆ/x).
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Proof. This is proven by induction on the length of formulas P of LT . Suppose P is
atomic having the form α(t1, . . . , tn). If x is not among t1, . . . , tn, then, by definition of
the notation (t/x), both P (a/x) and P (dˆ/x) reduce to P , and the proposition is obviously
true. Suppose x is among t1, . . . , tn; say x is ti. Since x is the only variable occurring
free in P , the tk for k 6= i are individual constants. Observe that I(a) = I(dˆ). We have
I |= P (a/x) iff vI((α(t1, . . . , ti−1, x, ti+1, . . . , tn))(a/x)) = T (notation |=)
iff vI(α(t1, . . . , ti−1, a, ti+1, . . . , tn)) = T (def. (t/x))
iff vI(α) holds for (I(t1), . . . , I(ti−1), I(a), I(ti+1), . . . , I(tn)) (def. vI )
iff vI(α) holds for (I(t1), . . . , I(ti−1), I(dˆ), I(ti+1), . . . , I(tn)) (above note)
iff vI(α(t1, . . . , ti−1, dˆ, ti+1, . . . , tn)) = T (def. vI )
iff vI(α(t1, . . . , ti−1, x, ti+1, . . . , tn)(dˆ/x)) = T (def. (t/x))
iff I |= P (dˆ/x) (notation |=)
Suppose P is of the form ¬Q. The induction hypothesis is that I |= Q(a/x) iff I |=
Q(dˆ/x). By definition of the notation |=, this amounts to vI(Q(a/x)) = T iff vI(Q(dˆ/x)) =
T, which in turn amounts to vI(Q(a/x)) = F iff vI(Q(dˆ/x)) = F. This gives
I |= P (a/x) iff vI(P (a/x)) = T (notation |=)
iff vI(¬Q(a/x)) = T (assumption)
iff vI(Q(a/x)) = F (def vI )
iff vI(Q(dˆ/x)) = F (induction hypothesis)
iff vI(¬Q(dˆ/x)) = T (def vI )
iff vI(P (dˆ/x)) = T (assumption)
iff I |= P (dˆ/x) (notation |=)
Suppose P is of the form Q → R. The induction hypothesis is that I |= Q(a/x) iff
I |= Q(dˆ/x) and I |= R(a/x) iff I |= R(dˆ/x). By definition of the notation |=, this
amounts to vI(Q(a/x)) = T iff vI(Q(dˆ/x)) = T and vI(R(a/x)) = T iff vI(R(dˆ/x)) = T,
and the former in turn amounts to vI(Q(a/x)) = F iff vI(Q(dˆ/x)) = F. This gives
I |= P (a/x) iff vI(P (a/x)) = T (notation |=)
iff vI((Q→ R)(a/x)) = T (assumption)
iff vI(Q(a/x)) = F or vI(R(a/x)) = T (def vI )
iff vI(Q(dˆ/x)) = F or vI(R(dˆ/x)) = T (induction hypothesis)
iff vI((Q→ R)(dˆ/x)) = T (def vI )
iff vI(P (dˆ/x)) = T (assumption)
iff I |= P (dˆ/x) (notation |=)
This completes the proof by induction. 
ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems, Vol. 0, No. 0, Article 0, Publication date: 0000.
App–6 D.G. Schwartz
Proposition 3.9. For any language L, the logical axioms of L, i.e., all formulas deriv-
able by means of the schema instantiation rules (R1) through (R3), are logically valid.
Proof. Let I be an interpretation of L. For Schema Instantiation 1, one can use
a proof by contradiction for each axiom schema. To illustrate the method, consider an
instance P → (Q→ P ) of axiom schema (S1). Let (P → (Q→ P ))(dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn)
be an I-instance and suppose that vI((P → (Q → P ))(dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn)) = F.
Then, by the definition of vI (and definition of the notation for substitution), this means
that vI(P (dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn)) = T and vI((Q → P )(dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn)) = F. But
then, for the same reasons, the latter means that vI(Q(dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn)) = T and
vI(P (dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn)) = F, the latter of which is a contradiction. Thus the I-
instance must be true in I. Since the I-instance was chosen arbitrarily, this means
that the formula P → (Q → P ) is valid in I. Since I was chosen arbitrarily, the latter
means that the formula is logically valid. Logical axioms derived as instances of axiom
schemas (S2), (S3), and (S4) may be handled similarly.
For Schema Instantiation 2, consider a schema instance (∀x)P → P (t/x) and an
I-instance
((∀x)P → P (t/x))(dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn).
By definition of the notation (t/x), the latter can be written
((∀x)P )(dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn)→ P (t/x)(dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn).
Suppose that
vI(((∀x)P )(dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn)) = T. (1)
It is desired to show that this implies
vI(P (t/x)(dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn)) = T (2)
from which it will follow, by the definition of vI , that
vi(((∀x)P → P (t/x))(dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn)) = T.
Case 1: x is not free in P . Then, by the definition of I-instance, x is not among
x1, . . . , xn, so that
((∀x)P )(dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn)
can be written
(∀x)(P (dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn))
Then it follows from (1) by the definition of vI that
vI(P (dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn)(dˆ/x)) = T, for all d ∈ DI .
Since x does not occur in P , this reduces to
vI(P (dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn)) = T. (3)
Observe that, since x does not occur in P , P (t/x) is just P , by definition of the notation
(t/x). Thus (3) amounts to (2).
Case 2: x is free in P . Subcase 2.a: t is an individual constant, say a. Then x does
not occur free in (∀x)P → P (t/x), so by the definition of I-instance, x is not among
x1, . . . , xn. Thus, as above,
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((∀x)P )(dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn)
can be written
(∀x)(P (dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn))
and it follows from (1) by the definition of vI that
vI(P (dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn)(dˆ/x)) = T, for all d ∈ DI . (4)
Note that, since x is not among x1, . . . , xn, P (dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn)(dˆ/x) is the same as
P (dˆ/x)(dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn), and (4) becomes
vI(P (dˆ/x)(dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn)) = T, for all d ∈ DI .
Thus, in particular, for d = I(a), we have
vI(P (dˆ/x)(dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn)) = T
from which it follows, by Proposition 8, that
vI(P (a/x)(dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn)) = T
This is (2) with a for t.
Subcase 2.b: t is the individual variable x. Then x occurs free in (∀x)P → P (t/x), so
by the definition of I-instance, x is among x1, . . . , xn. Say x is xi. Then (∀x)P is (∀xi)P .
Since xi is bound in (∀xi)P , one has by definition of the notation (t/x) that
((∀xi)P )(dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn)
can be written
(∀xi)(P (dˆ1, . . . , dˆi−1, dˆi+1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn))
and it follows from (1) by the definition of vI that
vI(P (dˆ1, . . . , dˆi−1, dˆi+1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn)(dˆ/xi)) = T, for all d ∈ DI
Then, in particular,
vI(P (dˆ1, . . . , dˆi−1, dˆi+1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn)(dˆi/xi)) = T
which can be written as
vI(P (dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn)) = T (5)
Observe that, since t is x, P (t/x) is just P , so (5) is (2) with x for t.
Subcase 2.c: t is an individual variable different from x, say y. Then (∀x)P → P (t/x))
is (∀x)P → P (y/x), in which y is free and x is not. Consider an I-instance
((∀x)P → P (y/x))(dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn)
Then, by the definition of I-instance, y is among x1, . . . , xn and x is not. Suppose y is
xi. Since x is not among x1, . . . , xn,
((∀x)P )(dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn)
can be written
(∀x)(P (dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn))
and it follows from (1) by the definition of vI that
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vI(P (dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn)(dˆ/x)) = T, for all d ∈ DI
In particular,
vI(P (dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn)(dˆi/x)) = T
Since y is xi, this is
vI(P (dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xi−1, y, xi+1, . . . , xn)(dˆi/x)) = T
Since (dˆi/x) is equivalent with (y/x)(dˆi/y), this can be written
vI(P (y/x)(dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xi−1, y, xi+1, . . . , xn)) = T
which, since y is xi, is
vI(P (y/x)(dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xi−1, xi, xi+1, . . . , xn)) = T
or simply
vI(P (y/x)(dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn)) = T
This is (2) with y for t.
For Schema Instatiation 3, consider a schema instance (∀x)(P → Q)→ (P → (∀x)Q),
where x is not free in P , and an I-instance
((∀x)(P → Q)→ (P → (∀x)Q))(dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn).
For the general case, assume that x occurs free in Q. Then, by the definition of I-
instance, x is among x1, . . . , xn. Say x is xi. By the definition of the notation (t/x), the
above can be written
((∀x)(P → Q))(dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn)→ (P → (∀x)Q)(dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn).
For a proof by contradiction, suppose that
vI(((∀x)(P → Q)→ (P → (∀x)Q))(dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn)) = F.
Then from the above, by definition of vI , we have
vI(((∀x)(P → Q))(dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn)) = T. (6)
and
vI((P → (∀x)Q)(dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn)) = F. (7)
Since x is xi, by definition of the notation (t/x) and the fact that x is bound in (∀x)(P →
Q), (6) can be written
vI(((∀x)(P → Q))(dˆ1, . . . , dˆi−1, dˆi+1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn)) = T
which, since x is not among x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn, can be written
vI((∀x)((P → Q)(dˆ1, . . . , dˆi−1, dˆi+1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn))) = T
Then, by the definition of vI , we have that, for all d ∈ DI ,
vI(((P → Q)(dˆ1, . . . , dˆi−1, dˆi+1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn))(dˆ/x)) = T. (8)
Since x is xi and x is not free in P , (7) can be written
vI((P → (∀x)Q)(dˆ1, . . . , dˆi−1, dˆi+1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn)) = F
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which, by definition of the notation (t/x), can be written
vI(P (dˆ1, . . . , dˆi−1, dˆi+1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn)→
((∀x)Q)(dˆ1, . . . , dˆi−1, dˆi+1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn)) = F
which, since x is not among x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn, can be written
vI(P (dˆ1, . . . , dˆi−1, dˆi+1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn)→
(∀x)(Q(dˆ1, . . . , dˆi−1, dˆi+1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn))) = F
By definition of vI , this gives
vI(P (dˆ1, . . . , dˆi−1, dˆi+1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn)) = T (9)
and
vI((∀x)(Q(dˆ1, . . . , dˆi−1, dˆi+1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn))) = F.
From the latter, by definition of vI , we have that there exist d ∈ DI such that
vI(Q(dˆ1, . . . , dˆi−1, dˆi+1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn)(dˆ/x)) = F. (10)
Since x is not free in P , by definition of the notation (t/x), (9) can be written
vI(P (dˆ1, . . . , dˆi−1, dˆi+1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn)(dˆ/x)) = T.
By the definition of vI , this together with (10) gives that there exist d ∈ DI such that
vI(P (dˆ1, . . . , dˆi−1, dˆi+1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn)(dˆ/x)→
Q(dˆ1, . . . , dˆi−1, dˆi+1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn)(dˆ/x)) = F
which, by definition of the notation (t/x), can be written
vI(((Q→ P )(dˆ1, . . . , dˆi−1, dˆi+1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn))(dˆ/x)) = F.
This contradicts (8). 
Proposition 3.10. Modus Ponens and Generalization are validity preserving.
Proof. Let T be a theory and let I be an interpretation for LT . For Modus Ponens,
consider an application (P, P → Q,Q) in LT and suppose that both P and P → Q are
valid in I. Where x1, . . . , xn are the distinct individual variables in P and Q, consider
the I-instances
P (dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn)
and
(P → Q)(dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn)
Then, by assumption,
vI(P (dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn)) = T (1)
and
vI((P → Q)(dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn)) = T
By definition of the notation (t/x), the latter can be written
vI(P (dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn)→ Q(dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn)) = T (2)
Then, by the definition of vI , (1) amd (2) imply
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vI(Q(dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn)) = T
Since the choice of the dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn was arbitrary, it follows that every I-
instance of Q is true, so that Q is valid in I.
For Generalization, consider an application (P, (∀x)P ) in LT and suppose that P is
valid in I. Let x1, . . . , xn be the distinct individual variables occurring in P . Then, by
the definition of valid,
vI(P (dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn)) = T (3)
for every choice of d1, . . . , dn ∈ DI . First suppose that x is not among the x1, . . . , xn.
Then, for any d ∈ DI ,
P (dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn)(dˆ/x)
is just another way of writing
P (dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn)
so that (3) can be written
vI(P (dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn)(dˆ/x)) = T
from which it follows by definition of vI that
vI((∀x)(P (dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn))) = T
Since the dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn were chosen arbitrarily, this means that (∀x)P is valid
in I.
Next suppose that x is among x1, . . . , xn, say x is xi. Then, by definition of the nota-
tion (t/x), (3) can be written
vI((P (dˆ1, . . . , dˆi−1, dˆi+1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , nn−1, xn+1, . . . , xn))(dˆi/x)) = T.
Since di was chosen arbitrarily from DI , by definition of vI ,
vI((∀x)P (dˆ1, . . . , dˆi−1, dˆi+1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , nn−1, xn+1, . . . , xn)) = T.
Since d1, . . . , di−1, di+1, . . . , dn were chosen arbitrarily from DI , this means that (∀x)P
is valid in I. 
Theorem 3.3. (Soundness Theorem for FOL) Let T be a theory with no extralogical
axioms and let P be a formula of LT . If T ` P , then P is logically valid.
Proof. This is established by induction on the length n of proofs P1, . . . , Pn in T . For
the base step, with n = 1, note that P1 can only be a logical axiom, and hence must be
logically valid by Proposition 3.9.
For the induction step, with n > 1, suppose first that Pn is inferred from some Pi
and Pj where i, j < n by Modus Ponens. The induction hypothesis is that Pi and Pj
are logically valid. Consider an interpretation I for LT . By definition of logical validity,
I |= Pi and I |= Pj , which, by Proposition 3.10, means that I |= Pn. Since I was chosen
arbitrarily, this means that Pn is logically valid.
Next suppose that Pn is inferred from some Pi by Generalization. The induction
hypothesis is that Pi is logically valid. Consider an interpretation I for LT . Then I |=
Pi, so Proposition 3.10 gives I |= Pn. Again, since I was arbitrary, Pn is logically valid.
This completes the induction step and concludes the proof by induction on n. 
Theorem 3.4. (Consistency Theorem) If a theory T has a model, then T is consistent.
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Proof. For a proof by contradiction, suppose that T has a model I but is inconsistent.
Since T is inconsistent, there is a formula P of LT such that T ` P and T ` ¬P . Let
x1, . . . , xn be the variables occurring free in P , and let d1, . . . , dn ∈ DI . Consider the I-
instances P (dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn and ¬P (dˆ1, . . . , dˆn/x1, . . . , xn). By the definition of vI ,
these cannot both be true in I. Thus P and ¬P cannot both be valid in I. So I cannot
be a model of T . This contradicts the assumption. 
Proposition 3.11. If T is a theory with no extralogical axioms, then T is consistent.
Proof. Let T be a theory with no extralogical axioms and let I be an interpretation
for LT . Then the theorems of T are valid in I, by Theorem 3.3 and the definition of
logically valid. Then I |= T , by definition of model for first-order theories. Whence T is
consistent, by Theorem 3.4. 
Proposition 3.12. Let Γ be the extralogical axioms of a theory T and let I be an
interpretation for LT . If I |= Γ, then I |= T .
Proof. This is established by induction on the length n of proofs P1, . . . , Pn in T .
For the base step, with n = 1, Pn must be an axiom. If Pn is a logical axiom, then
I |= Pn because Pn is logically valid by Proposition 3.9. If Pn is an extralogical axiom,
then I |= Pn by assumption. For the induction step, with n > 1, the proof is similar
to the corresponding case in the proof of Theorem 3.3. To wit, if the premises in an
application of either Modus Ponens or Generalization are valid in I, then, since the
rules are validity preserving, by Proposition 3.10, the conclusions are valid in I. This
completes the induction step and concludes the proof by induction on n. 
Proposition 3.13. Let (Lt, Bt) be an entry in a derivation path for a normal DRS. If
there is an interpretation I of Lt that is a model of Bt, then Bt is consistent.
Proof. Suppose that I is an interpretation for Lt such that I |= Bt. Then I is a model
of the set of active formulas in Bt, by definition of model for belief sets. Let Tt be the
theory determined by (Lt, Bt). By definition of Tt, the extralogical axioms of Tt are the
active formulas inBt. It follows that I |= Tt, by Proposition 3.12. Hence Tt is consistent,
by Theorem 3.4.
Let T be the theory with language Lt and no extralogical axioms. Let Γ be the set of
active formulas in Bt. Then T (Γ) has the same theorems as Tt, by Proposition 3.3. So
T (Γ) is consistent. Thus Γ is consistent, by definition of consistent for sets Γ. Hence Bt
is consistent, by definition of consistent for the belief sets Bt. 
Proposition 4.1. The DMA is a normal DRS.
Proof. The DMA employs no belief revision algorithm other than Dialectical Belief
Revision, so this proposition is established by Proposition 3.1 and the definition of
normal for an arbitrary DRS. 
Theorem 4.1. The foregoing algorithms serve to maintain the graph, ignoring are-
disjoint links, as a directed acyclic graph without redundant links.
Proof. This uses induction on the length t of derivation paths to show that all graphs
Gt have the desired property. For the base step, where t = 0, we have Gt = ∅, and the
graph has the desired property by default. For the induction step, where t ≥ 0, it is
necessary to consider each of the five event types and establish that, if the graph has
the desired property before an event of that type, it will continue to have the property
after completion of the event up to any point where it invokes an occurrence of another
event.
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Event Type 1: This enters a document-category link into the graph, unless this would
create a redundant path. Document-category links do not participate in loops. Thus the
desired property is preserved.
Event Type 2: Nothing is added to the graph, but links may be removed. Removing
links cannot affect the desired property.
Event Type 3: No changes are made to the graph.
Event Type 4: An event of this type enters a category subsumption link into the
graph, unless this would be a redundant link or would create a loop. Thus in this case
the desired property is preserved.
Event Type 5: This adds an are-disjoint link to the graph, which has no effect with
regard to desired property.
This concludes the induction step and completes the proof by induction on t. 
Theorem 4.2. After any process initiated by a user input terminates, the resulting
belief set will contain a formula of the form α(a) iff the formula is derivable from the
formulas corresponding to links in the graph.
Proof. This uses induction on the length t of derivation paths to show that every
belief set Bt has the desired property. Note from the descriptions of the five event types
that the formulas corresponding to links in the graph are the extralogical axioms that
have been input by the users. Recall that these inputs occur during Event Types 1, 4,
and 5. All other formulas in the belief set are derived from these using Aristotelian
Syllogism and do not correspond to links in the graph.
For the base step, where t = 0, we have Bt = ∅, and the belief set has the desired
property by default. For the induction step, where t ≥ 0, it is necessary to consider
each of the three types of user input events and establish that, if the belief set has the
desired property before an event of that type, it will continue to have the property after
completion of the process initiated by that event. To simplify the discussion, the fol-
lowing identifies the predicate symbol representing a classification category with that
category, so that, for example, an expression such as ‘the classification category repre-
sented by α’ will be shortened to ‘the category α’, unless the more detailed clarification
is required by the context. Similarly, the individual constant representing a document
will be associated with that document.
Consider an input of the form α(a). This is an event of Type 1. The associated al-
gorithm adds this formula to the belief set and adds a corresponding is-an-element-of
link into the graph. It then proceeds to determine whether this introduces a contradic-
tion into the belief set, and if so, invokes an event of Type 2. That the process initiated
by an event of Type 2 does not alter the desired property is established separately be-
low. Next the algorithm proceeds to search for all explicitly expressed subsumptions
of the category α by another category β, and, via Aristotelian Syllogism, derives the
formula β(a) and provides this formula to the controller. The latter is an event of Type
3, wherein the derived formula is entered into the belief set. The algorithm for Event
Type 3 then proceeds recursively through formulas expressing child-parent (subclass-
of) relations between categories to find all ancestors γ of β, and, for each, adds the
formula γ(a) into the belief set (and each time checking as above whether the added
formula might lead to an event of Type 2). Thus this process ensures that the resulting
belief set will contain all, and only, formulas of the form α(a) that are implicit in the
new belief set. This will be the set implicit in the graph, as long as the belief set con-
tains all child-parent category expressions, i.e., formulas of the form (∀x)(α(x)→ β(x)),
implicit in the graph. That this is the case is established below. Thus the resulting be-
lief set will have the desired property.
Consider an input of the form (∀x)(α(x) → β(x)). This is an event of Type 4. The
associated algorithm first checks to see if there is information in the belief set indicat-
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ing that α and β are disjoint, and, if so, rejects the input. Otherwise it checks to see
if the formula would create a redundant path in the subsumption hierarchy, and if so,
rejects the input. Otherwise it checks to see if the formula would create a loop in the
subsumption hierarchy, and if so, rejects the input. Otherwise, the algorithm adds this
formula to the belief set and adds a corresponding is-a-subclass-of link into the graph.
It then proceeds to search the belief set for any formulas of the form α(a) where α is
the predicate symbol in the input formula, and, for each, invokes the process of Event
Type 3 discussed above to ensure that the belief set contains all, and only, formulas
expressing membership of a in all ancestors γ of β, insofar as the relevant child-parent
relations are expressed by formulas in the belief set. Now note that it is a feature of
Event Type 4 that an is-a-subclass-of link is entered into the graph if and only if the
corresponding formula is entered into the belief set. This establishes the fact promised
above; more exactly, it shows that the child-parent relations expressed in the belief
set are exactly those that are expressed in the graph. It also shows that the belief set
resulting from the present event of Type 4 will have the desired property.
Last, consider an input of the form (∀x)¬(α(x) ∧ β(x)), an event of Type 5. This does
not lead to the introduction of any new formulas of the forms α(a) or (∀x)(α(x) →
β(x)) into the belief set. Thus both the collection of formulas of the form α(a) and
the collection of formulas of the form (∀x)(α(x) → β(x)) that are derivable from the
extralogical axioms remain unchanged. As with the events triggered by the other two
forms of user input, however, this can conclude with one or more instances of Event
Type 2. This is considered next.
An event of Type 2, wherein the formula ⊥ is provided to the controller, initiates
an application of Dialectical Belief Revision. The objective of this process is to iden-
tify extralogical axioms that were previously input by the user and that led to this
derivation of ⊥ and to change the status of one or more of these to disbel so that the
derivation is removed. It is possible, depending on the preference of the human user,
that this will be accomplished by changing the status of the extralogical axiom of the
form (∀x)¬(α(x) ∧ β(x)) that was used as a premise in the associated application of
Conflict Detection. In this case, the resulting belief set obviously has the desired prop-
erty. Otherwise, the premise of the form α(a) in the application of Conflict Detection is
explored. Say that the formula of this form is in fact α(a), for some predicate symbol α
and individual constant a. There are two cases.
Case 1: α(a) is an extralogical axiom. Then this formula is the only remaining can-
didate for status change in order to remove the conflict. Changing the status of this
formula to disbel requires removing the is-an-element-of link connecting a to α from
the graph. After doing this, the to-list of this formula is used to determine if it has
served as a premise in any other rule applications. If so, then these must have been
applications of Aristotelian Syllogism leading to the addition of formulas of the form
β(a) into the belief set for categories β that subsume α. Moreover, by the description
of the Event Types 1 and 3, this includes all categories that subsume α, and no others.
The Dialectical Belief Revision process forward chains through all such deductions,
changing the status of all such formulas β(a) to disbel. This has the effect of remov-
ing all assignments of a to categories that subsume α, and no others. Also, no new
document-category assignments are added. Thus the belief set will have the desired
property.
Case 2: α(a) was entered into the belief set as the conclusion of a rule application.
Then α(a) was derived from some formulas β(a) and (∀x)(β(x)→ α(x)) by Aristotelian
Syllogism. If the former is not an extralogical axiom, then it was derived as the con-
clusion in an application of Aristotelian Syllogism. By proceeding backwards in this
manner through the derivations using from-lists, one eventually arrives at one or more
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extralogical axioms of the form β(a) and/or one or more extralogical axioms of the form
(∀x)(β(x)→ γ(x)). This gives two subcases.
Subcase 2.a: An extralogical axiom β(a) has its status changed to disbel. The process
here is identical to the above Case 1, with β here playing the role of α.
Subcase 2.b: An extralogical axiom (∀x)(β(x) → γ(x)) has its status changed to dis-
bel. This requires removing the is-a-subclass-of link connecting β to γ from the graph.
Thus γ no longer subsumes β. The algorithm uses to-lists to forward chain through
derivations originating with this formula, changing the status of all derived formu-
las to disbel. The rule applications in these derivations must all be of Aristotelian
Syllogism. These will have had the effect of assigning any documents in β to γ and
all ancestors of γ. The Dialectical Belief Revision process forward chains through all
such deductions, changing the status of all such formulas to disbel. This has the effect
of removing all such document assignments, and no others. Also, no new document-
category assignments are added. Thus, with respect to formulas expressing document-
category relations, the belief set will have the desired property.
This concludes the induction step and completes the proof by induction on t. 
Theorem 4.3. For any derivation path in the DMA, the belief set that results at the
conclusion of a process initiated by a user input will be consistent.
Proof. Let B0, B1, . . . and L0, L1, . . . be the belief sets and languages appearing in a
derivation path for the DMA. Define subsequences Bˆ0, Bˆ1, . . . and Lˆ0, Lˆ1, . . . by (i) Bˆ0 =
B0 and Lˆ0 = L0, and (ii) for u ≥ 0, where t is the time stamp for which Bˆu = Bt, Bˆu+1
and Lˆu+1 are the belief set and language that result from application of the algorithm
initiated by the user input that produced Bt+1 from Bt. The theorem amounts to the
statement that all the Bˆu are consistent. By Proposition 4.1, the DMA is a normal
DRS, so, by Proposition 3.13, it is sufficient to show that every Bˆu has a model, or
more exactly, that there is an interpretation I of Lˆu such that I |= Bˆu. This can be
established by induction on u.
For the base step, with u = 0, we have Bˆu = Bu = ∅. Thus the set Γ of active formulas
in Bˆu is ∅. Any interpretation I of Lˆ0 = L0 is a model of ∅, by definition of model for
sets of formulas; i.e., all formulas in ∅ are valid in I by default. Thus any such I is a
model of Γ, which makes it a model of Bˆu by definition of model for belief sets. (Note:
There is an alternate, more direct, proof that Bˆ0 is consistent. The theory determined
by (L0, B0) is consistent by Proposition 11, whence Bˆ0 = B0 is consistent by definition
of consistent for belief sets.)
For the induction step, with u ≥ 0, it is required to show for each of the three types
of user input, that, if there is an interpretation I of Lˆu such that I |= Bˆu, then I can
be transformed into an interpretation I∗ for Lˆu+1 such that I∗ |= Bˆu+1. In all cases, I∗
will agree with I on all predicate symbols and individual constant symbols of Lˆu.
Consider an input α(a). This is an event of Type 1, which has three phases: (i) add the
input formula into the current belief set, (ii) scan the belief set for any opportunities
to apply Conflict Detection, and (iii) scan the belief set for any opportunities to apply
Aristotelian Syllogism. The latter two phases lead to further events, respectively, of
Types 2 and 3. We consider these three phases in order. Let t be such that Bˆu = Bt.
Then Lˆu = Lt.
Phase (i): The objective is to show that I can be expanded to an interpretation I ′
of Lt+1 such that I ′ |= α(a). If either α or a is missing from Lt, then Lt+1 will be
the language obtained from Lt by adding the ones that are missing; otherwise Lt+1 =
Lt. Case 1: Neither are added. Let DI′ = DI and extend I to I ′ by setting I ′(α) =
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I(α) ∪ {I(a)}, i.e., the relation designated by α is expanded to include the document
designated by a. Case 2: α is added, but a is not. Let DI′ = DI and extend I to I ′ by
assigning I ′(α) = {I(a)}, i.e., I ′(α) is a new unary relation on DI′ that holds only for
I(a). Case 3: a is added, but α is not. Subcase 3.a: a is taken as representing a new
document d not in the domain DI (perhaps the most typical case). Let DI′ = DI ∪ {d},
assign I ′(a) = d, and let I ′(α) = I(α) ∪ {d}. Subcase 3.b: a is taken as representing
a document d ∈ DI (this is atypical inasmuch as in the DMA one should not need
more than one representation for the same document). Let DI′ = DI and let I ′(α) =
I(α)∪{d}. Case 4: Both α and a are added. Subcase 4.a: a is taken as representing a new
document d not in the domain DI (typical). Let DI′ = DI ∪{d}, assign I ′(a) = d, and set
I ′(α) = {d}. Subcase 4.b: a is taken as representing a document d ∈ DI (atypical). Let
DI′ = DI , assign I ′(a) = d, and set I ′(α) = {d}. It follows in every case that I ′ |= α(a).
Phase (ii): Note that Bt+1 = Bt∪{(α(a), λ)}, where λ is the appropriate label. Since I
is a model of Bt, the foregoing makes I ′ a model of Bt+1, unless the inclusion of I(a) in
the relation I(α) conflicts with some active formulas in Bt expressing that I(a) ∈ I(β)
and that I(α) and I(β) are disjoint. Note that this can only occur in the above Case
1, since only it implies that both a and α are already in Lt. Whether there is such
a conflict is determined, as described for Event Type 1, by scanning the set Bt+1 for
any active formulas of the form (∀x)¬(α(x) ∧ β(x)) or (∀x)¬(β(x) ∧ α(x)), where α is
the predicate symbol of the input formula and β is any other predicate symbol, and
for each such formula scanning for any active occurrence of the formula β(a), where
a is the individual constant of the input formula. All such formulas β(a) implicit in
Bt+1 are ensured to be present in Bt+1 by Theorem 6. If no such conflicting formulas
are found, then, as just asserted, I ′ |= Bt+1. Otherwise, the found formulas will have
triggered an event of Type 2 leading to an application of Dialectical Belief Revision,
in which case it remains to show that further modifications can be made to I ′ and
Bt+1 that transforms I ′ into a model of the belief set, call it Bt∗ , that results from this
process. This fact regarding Event Type 2 is established below.
For phase (iii), let Bt∗∗ be the most recent belief set; i.e., it is either the above Bt+1
or the above Bt∗ , depending on whether any conflicts were detected. Let I∗∗ be the
given model of Bt∗∗ . In this phase, Bt∗∗ is searched for active formulas of the form
(∀x)(α(x)→ β(x)), where α is the predicate symbol of the input formula, and, if found,
Aristotelian Syllogism is applied to this and the input formula to infer β(a), which is
provided to the controller. This constitutes an event of Type 3. Note that there can be
any number of such β, each leading to an event of Type 3. Thus it remains to show
that, if, at the beginning of an event of Type 3, the belief set has a model, then, at the
conclusion of the process initiated by that event, the resulting belief set has a model.
This is established below. Observe that Bˆu+1 is the belief set that results from this
process. Note also that Lˆu+1 = Lt+1. Given the following verifications regarding events
of Type 2 and 3, the foregoing shows that Lˆu+1 has an interpretation that is a model
of Bˆu+1.
Consider an event of Type 2, namely, providing ⊥ to the controller. This only occurs
via an application of Conflict Detection. The formula ⊥ is entered into the belief set,
and this initiates an application of Dialectical Belief Revision. Let Bt be the belief set
that is current prior to the occurrence of this event, and let I be an interpretation of
Lt that models Bt. It is desired to show that I can be transformed into a interpretation
I ′ of Lt that is a model of the belief set Bt′ that results from the Dialectical Belief
Revision process.
Let α(a), β(a), and (∀x)¬(α(x) ∧ β(x)) be the premises in the application of Conflict
Detection. The first phase of the Dialectical Belief Revision process employs from-lists
to backtrack through the derivations of these formulas, identifying all extralogical ax-
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ioms involved in their proofs. One of these will be the formula (∀x)¬(α(x) ∧ β(x)). If
the conflict is resolved by changing the status of this formula to disbel, then Bt′ is ob-
tained from Bt by making this change in this formula’s label. Then letting I ′ = I gives
I ′ |= Bt′ .
The formulas α(a) and β(a) in the application of Conflict Detection could also be
extralogical axioms. If either is, then the conflict could be resolved by changing the
status of that formula to disbel. Suppose the formula whose status is changed is α(a).
(The considerations will be similar for β(a).) LetBt′ be obtained fromBt by making this
change in this formula’s label. Let I ′ be obtained from I by letting I ′(α) = I(α)−{I(a)},
i.e., removing the document I(a) from the category I(α). Then I ′ |= Bt′ .
The formulas α(a) and β(a) in the application of Conflict Detection might not be
extralogical axioms, however. Suppose that this is true for α(a). (The considerations
will be similar for β(a).) Then this formula was derived by an application of Aris-
totelian Syllogism. Suppose that the premises in this rule application were γ(a) and
(∀x)(γ(x) → α(x)). Consider the ways in which these formulas could have come to be
input into the belief set. If γ(a) had been input as an extralogical axiom, then the con-
flict could be resolved by changing the status of this formula to disbel, after which the
second phase of Dialectical Belief Revision forward-chains via the formula’s to-list and
changes the status of α(a) to disbel. In this case, Bt′ is obtained from Bt by making this
change in the label for γ(a). Let I ′ be obtained from I by setting I ′(γ) = I(γ) − {I(a)}
and I ′(α) = I(α)−{I(a)}, i.e., removing the document I(a) from the categories I(γ) and
I(α). Then I ′ |= Bt′ . If (∀x)(γ(x)→ α(x)) had been input as an extralogical axiom, then
the conflict could be resolved by changing the status of this formula to disbel, after
which the second phase of Dialectical Belief Revision forward-chains via the formula’s
to-list and changes the status of α(a) to disbel. In this case, let Bt′ is obtained from Bt
by making this change in the label for (∀x)(γ(x)→ α(x)). Let I ′ be obtained from I by
setting I ′(α) = I(α)− {I(a)}, i.e., removing the document I(a) from the category I(α).
Then I ′ |= Bt′ .
If γ(a) had not been input as an extralogical axiom, then it was derived by an ap-
plication of Aristotelian Syllogism. By continuing to backtrack in this manner using
from-lists, the process eventually finds all extralogical axioms involved in the deriva-
tion of the current occurrence of ⊥. Some will be of the form α′(a), where a is the
individual constant in the premise of the related application of Conflict Detection, and
some will be of the form (∀x)(β′(x)→ γ′(x)). One or more of these will have their belief
status changed to disbel, enough to ensure that the derivation of ⊥ no longer applies.
Then Bt′ is obtained from Bt by making these changes in these formulas’ labels. Note
incidentally that the corresponding Bt′ will have been obtained by following the to-
lists of all such formulas, similarly changing the labels of all their consequences up
to and including the triggering occurrence of ⊥. Let I ′ be obtained from I by setting
I ′(α′′) = I(α′′)−{I(a)} for every formula α′′(a) whose label is changed to disbel in this
second phase of the Dialectical Belief Revision process. Then I ′ |= Bt′ .
The forgoing shows that, whichever of the available choices are made to resolve the
detected conflict, there will be an interpretation I ′ of Lt that is a model of the resulting
belief set Bt′ .
Consider an event of Type 3, where a formula of the form α(a) is provided to the con-
troller as the result of an inference rule application. This only occurs via an application
of Aristotelian Syllogism. The formula α(a) is entered into the belief set. Because no
new symbols need to be added, Lˆu+1 = Lˆu. Let I be an interpretation of Lˆu that models
Bˆu. It is desired to show that I can be transformed into a model I ′ of the belief set
Bu+1 that results from the process associated with this event. This can be established
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by the same considerations as above for Event Type 1, Phases (i) and (ii), except that,
in Phase (i), here only Case 1 applies.
Consider an input (∀x)(α(x) → β(x)). This is an event of Type 4. Let t be such that
Bˆu = Bt. Then Lˆu = Lt. Let I be an interpretation of Lˆu that models Bˆu. Then I is
an interpretation of Lt that models Bt. As prescribed by the event type’s description,
if α and β are already in Lt, the input is rejected if there are active formulas asserting
that the categories represented by α and β are disjoint, or if the input formula would
create either a redundant path or a loop. Assuming that none of these is the case, then
the process has two phases: (i) add the input formula into the belief set, (ii) scan the
belief set for any opportunities to apply Aristotelian syllogism, leading to invocations
of Event Type 3.
Phase (i): HereBt+1 = Bt∪{((∀x)(α(x)→ β(x)), λ)}, where λ is the appropriate label.
The objective is to show that I can be expanded to an interpretation I ′ of Lt+1 such that
I ′ |= Bt+1. This amounts to showing that I can be expanded to an interpretation I ′ of
Lt+1 such that I ′ |= (∀x)(α(x) → β(x)). If either α or β is missing from Lt, then Lt+1
will be the language obtained from Lt by adding the ones that are missing; otherwise
Lt+1 = Lt. There are four cases depending on which symbols are added. In all cases,
set DI′ = DI . Case 1: Neither is added. Then α and β are already in Lt. Form I ′
from I by setting I ′(β) = I(β) ∪ (I(α) − I(β)), i.e., add to I(β) the elements in I(α)
that are not already in I(β). Note that in a conventional first-order system, such a
redefinition of I(β) would not be permissible, since it could potentially invalidate some
theorems of the form ¬β(a) expressing that I(a) is not a member of I(β). This potential
problem is ruled out in the DMA, however, since the DMA controller does not enable
formulas of this form to ever be input into the belief set, either by a human user or via
derivations. Case 2: α is added, but β is not. Set I ′(α) = ∅, i.e., introduce a new relation
corresponding to α and let it be the empty subset of I(β). Case 3: β is added, but α is
not. Set I ′(β) = I ′(α), i.e., introduce a new relation corresponding to β and make it
coextensive with I(α). Case 4: Both α and β are added. Set I ′(α) = I ′(β) = ∅. It follows
in every case that the formula (∀x)(α(x)→ β(x)) will be true in I ′. Thus, in every case,
I ′ |= Bt+1.
Phase (ii): The above Bt+1 is scanned for formulas of the form α(a), where α is the
predicate symbol of the input formula, and, if found, Aristotelian Syllogism is applied,
leading to an event of Type 3. That this results in a belief set with a model was estab-
lished in the foregoing.
Let Lˆu+1 andBˆu+1 be the language and belief set that results from the above process.
It follows that there is an interpretation I ′ of Lˆu+1 such that I ′ |= Bu+1.
Consider an input (∀x)¬(α(x) ∧ β(x)). This is an event of Type 5. Let t be such that
Bˆu = Bt. Then Lˆu = Lt. Let I be an interpretation of Lˆu that models Bˆu. Then I is
an interpretation of Lt that models Bt. Then Bt+1 = Bt ∪ {((∀x)¬(α(x) ∧ β(x)), λ)},
where λ is the appropriate label. It is desired to show that I can be expanded to an
interpretation I ′ of Lt+1 such that I ′ |= Bt+1. This amounts to showing that I can be
expanded to an interpretation I ′ of Lt+1 such that I ′ |= (∀x)¬(α(x) ∧ β(x)). If either
α or β is missing from Lt, then Lt+1 will be the language obtained from Lt by adding
the ones that are missing; otherwise Lt+1 = Lt. There are four cases depending on
which symbols are added. In all cases, set DI′ = DI . Case 1: Neither is added. Then
α and β are already in Lt, and I(α) ∩ I(β) = ∅. Set I ′ = I. Case 2: α is added, but β
is not. Set I ′(α) = ∅, i.e., introduce a new relation corresponding to α and let it be the
empty set. Case 3: β is added, but α is not. Set I ′(β) = ∅, i.e., introduce a new relation
corresponding to β and let it be the empty set. Case 4: Both α and β are added. Set
I ′(α) = I ′(β) = ∅. Thus in every case the formula (∀x)¬(α(x) ∧ β(x)) will be true in I ′.
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It follows that I ′ |= Bt+1, unless the provision that I(α) and I(β) are disjoint conflicts
with some formulas in Bt+1 expressing that I(a) ∈ I(α) and I(a) ∈ I(β). Note that this
can only occur in the above Case 1, since it implies that both α and β are already in
Lt. Whether there is a conflict of this type is determined by scanning the set Bt+1 for
any formulas of the form α(a) and β(a), where α and β are the predicate symbols of
the input formula and a is any individual constant. All such formulas α(a) and β(a)
implicit in Bt+1 are ensured to be present in Bt+1 by Theorem 4.2.
If no such formulas are found, then Bˆu+1 = Bt+1 and we have that I ′ |= Bˆu+1.
Otherwise, the found formulas will have triggered an event of Type 2 leading to an
application of Dialectical Belief Revision. That this leads to a belief set with a model
was established above.
This concludes the induction step and completes the proof by induction on u. 
Proposition 5.1. Every MIS is a normal DRS.
Proof. No MIS employs a belief revision algorithm other than Dialectical Belief
Revision, so this proposition is established by Proposition 3.1 and the definition of
normal for an arbitrary DRS. 
Theorem 5.1. The foregoing algorithms serve to maintain the hierarchy with re-
spect to the object and kind nodes as a directed acyclic graph without redundant links.
Proof. This uses induction on the length t of derivation paths to show that all in-
heritance hierarchies Ht have the desired property. For the base step, where t = 0, we
have Ht = ∅, and the hierarchy has the desired property by default. For the induction
step, where t ≥ 0, it is necessary to consider each of the eight event types and estab-
lish that, if the hierarchy has the desired property before an event of that type, it will
continue to have the property after completion of the event up to any point where it
invokes an occurrence of another event.
Event Type 1: This enters an object-kind link into the hierarchy, unless this would
create a redundant path. Object nodes do not participate in loops. Thus the desired
property is preserved.
Event Types 2, 3, and 4: No changes are made to the hierarchy.
Event Type 5: Nothing is added to the hierarchy, but links may be removed. Remov-
ing links cannot affect the desired property.
Event Type 6: An event of this type enters a subkind-kind link into the hierarchy,
unless this would create a loop or a redundant path. Thus in this case the desired
property is preserved.
Event Types 7 and 8: These add has-property links to the hierarchy, which has no
effect with regard to desired property.
This concludes the induction step and completes the proof by induction on t. 
Theorem 5.2. After any process initiated by a user input terminates, the resulting
belief set will contain a formula of the form α(k)(a) or α(p)(a) or ¬α(p)(a) iff the formula
is derivable from the formulas corresponding to links in the inheritance hierarchy,
observing the specificity principle.
Proof. This uses induction on the length t of derivation paths to show that every
belief set Bt has the desired property. Note from the descriptions of the eight event
types that the formulas corresponding to links in the inheritance hierarchy are the
extralogical axioms that have been input by the users. Recall that these inputs occur
during Event Types 1, 6, 7 and 8. All other formulas in the belief set are derived from
these using Aristotelian Syllogism and do not correspond to links in the hierarchy.
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For the base step, where t = 0, we have Bt = ∅, and the belief set has the desired
property by default. For the induction step, where t ≥ 0, it is necessary to consider
each of the four types of user input events and establish that, if the belief set has the
desired property before an event of that type, it will continue to have the property
after completion of the process initiated by that event. To simplify the discussion, the
following identifies the predicate symbol representing a kind or property with that
kind or property, so that, for example, an expression such as ‘the kind represented by
α’ will be shortened to ‘the kind α’, unless the more detailed clarification is required by
the context. Similarly, the individual constant representing an object will be associated
with that object.
Consider an input of the form α(k)(a). This is an event of Type 1. The associated
algorithm adds this formula to the belief set and adds a corresponding object-kind
link into the hierarchy. It then proceeds to search for all explicitly expressed subsump-
tions of the kind α(k) by another kind β(k), and, via Aristotelian Syllogism, derives
the formula β(k)(a) and provides this formula to the controller. The latter is an event
of Type 2, wherein the derived formula is entered into the belief set. The algorithm
for Event Type 2 then proceeds recursively through formulas expressing child-parent
(subkind-kind) relations between kind nodes to find all ancestors γ(k) of β(k), and, for
each, adds the formula γ(k)(a) into the belief set. Thus this process ensures that the
resulting belief set will contain all, and only, formulas of the form α(k)(a) that are
implicit in the new belief set. This will be the set implicit in the hierarchy, as long
as the belief set contains all child-parent kind expressions, i.e., formulas of the form
(∀x)(α(k)(x) → β(k)(x)), implicit in the hierarchy. That this is the case is established
below. Thus the resulting belief set will have the desired property regarding formulas
of the form α(k)(a) (as expressed in the Theorem statement and not to be confused with
the input formula).
The algorithm for Event Type 1 next searches the belief set for formulas expressing
that objects of the kind α(k) have some property β(p), and for each such formula applies
Aristotelian Syllogism to infer β(p)(a). This invokes an event of Type 3, which adds
this formula to the belief set unless this is overridden by a more specific occurrence of
¬β(p)(a) in the hierarchy. Note that this is the only way that a formula of this form can
be entered into the belief set. The Type 3 event algorithm then proceeds to search for
a formula that contradicts β(p)(a), and, if found, invokes an event of Type 5. The Type
3 event algorithm may do this zero or more times. That a Type 5 event preserves the
desired property for the belief set is established below.
Last it searches the belief set for formulas expressing that object of the kind α(k)
does not have some property β(p), and for each such formula applying Aristotelian
Syllogism to infer ¬β(p)(a). This invokes an event of Type 4, which adds this formula
to the belief set unless this is overridden by a more specific occurrence of β(p)(a) in the
hierarchy. Note that this is the only way that a formula of this form can be entered
into the belief set. The Type 4 event algorithm then proceeds to search for a formula
that contradicts ¬β(p)(a), and, if found, invokes an event of Type 5. The Type 4 event
algorithm may do this zero or more times. That a Type 5 event preserves the desired
property for the belief set is established below.
It follows that the resulting belief set will have the desired property regarding for-
mulas of the form α(p)(a) and ¬α(p)(a) (as expressed in the Theorem statement). This
completes the consideration for an input to the form α(k)(a).
Consider an input of the form (∀x)(α(k)(x) → β(k)(x)). This is an event of Type 6.
The associated algorithm first checks to see if the formula would create a redundant
path or a loop in the subsumption hierarchy, and if so, rejects the input. Otherwise, the
algorithm adds this formula to the belief set and adds a corresponding subkind-kind
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link into the hierarchy. It then proceeds to search the belief set for any formulas of the
form α(k)(a) where α(k) is the predicate symbol in the premise component of the input
formula, and, for each, invokes the process of Event Type 3 discussed above to ensure
that the belief set contains all, and only, formulas expressing membership of a in all
ancestors γ(k) of β(k), insofar as the relevant child-parent relations are expressed by
formulas in the belief set. Now note that it is a feature of Event Type 6 that a subkind-
kind link is entered into the hierarchy if and only if the corresponding formula is
entered into the belief set. This establishes the fact promised above, namely, it shows
that the child-parent relations expressed in the belief set are exactly those that are
expressed in the hierarchy. It also shows that the belief set resulting from the present
event of Type 6 will have the desired property.
Consider an input of the form (∀x)(α(k)(x) → β(p)(x)), an event of Type 7. The al-
gorithm for this event type adds this formula into the belief set and adds the corre-
sponding has-property link into the inheritance hierarchy. It then proceeds to search
the belief set for formulas of the form α(k)(a), and, for each, applies Aristotelian Syl-
logism to infer β(p)(a), and adds this to the belief set unless this is overridden by a
more specific occurrence of ¬β(p)(a) in the hierarchy (and checking as above whether
the added formula might introduce a contradiction and lead to an event of Type 5). As
noted above, this is the only way that a formula of this form can be entered into the
belief set. It follows that the belief set resulting from the present event of Type 7 will
have the desired property.
Consider an input of the form (∀x)(α(k)(x) → ¬β(p)(x)), an event of Type 8. The
algorithm for this event type adds this formula into the belief set and adds the corre-
sponding has-property link into the inheritance hierarchy. It then proceeds to search
the belief set for formulas of the form α(k)(a), and, for each, applies Aristotelian Syl-
logism to infer ¬β(p)(a), and adds this to the belief set unless this is overridden by a
more specific occurrence of β(p)(a) in the hierarchy (and checking as above whether
the added formula might introduce a contradiction and lead to an event of Type 5). As
noted above, this is the only way that a formula of this form can be entered into the
belief set. It follows that the belief set resulting from the present event of Type 8 will
have the desired property.
An event of Type 5, wherein the formula ⊥ is provided to the controller, initiates
an application of Dialectical Belief Revision. The objective of this process is to identify
extralogical axioms that were previously input by a user and that led to this derivation
of ⊥, and to change the status of one or more of these to disbel so that the derivation
is removed. There are two ways in which this process can be triggered: (1) a formula
of the form α(p)(a) is derived by means of a rule application and is found to contradict
a formula of the form ¬α(p)(a) already active in the belief set, and (2) a formula of the
form ¬α(p)(a) is derived by means of a rule application and is found to contradict a
formula of the form α(p)(a) already active in the belief set. We here consider only Case
1, as Case 2 is analogous.
In this case, α(p)(a) was derived from some formulas β(k)(a) and (∀x)(β(k)(x) →
α(p)(x)) by Aristotelian Syllogism. By the definition of the controller, the latter formula
must be an extralogical axiom input by a user, and the former must have been derived
from some formulas of the forms γ(k)(a) and (∀x)(γ(k)(x) → β(k)(x)) by Aristotelian
Syllogism. This gives two subcases.
Subcase 1.a: The extralogical axiom (∀x)(β(k)(x) → α(p)(x)) has its status changed
to disbel. This requires removing the has-property link connecting β(k) to α(p) from the
hierarchy. The algorithm uses to-lists to forward chain through derivations originat-
ing with this formula, changing the status of all derived formulas to disbel. The rule
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applications in these derivations must all be of Aristotelian Syllogism, and will have
had the effect of assigning objects in β(k) the property α(p). Note that such assignments
are not represented by links in the hierarchy. The Dialectical Belief Revision process
has the effect of removing all such property assignments (changing their statuses to
disbel), and no others. Also, no new property assignments are added. It follows that
the belief set will have the desired property.
Subcase 1.b: The derivation of β(k)(a) is explored. This requires working backwards
through derivations using from-lists, eventually arriving at some extralogical axioms
of the forms γ(k)(a) and (∀x)(γ(k)(x)→ δ(k)(x)). If a formula of the former form has its
status changed to disbel, then the corresponding object-kind link is removed from the
hierarchy and Dialectical Belief Revision proceeds to forward chain through to-lists,
changing the status of all derived formulas to disbel. These derived formulas will have
been assignments of a to kinds that subsume γ, leading up the hierarchy to β(k), and
then to the formula α(p)(a)). If a formula of the latter form has its status changed to
disbel, then the corresponding subkind-kind link is removed from the hierarchy and
Dialectical Belief Revision proceeds to forward chain through to-lists, changing the
status of all derived formulas to disbel. Again, these derived formulas will have been
assignments of a to kinds that subsume γ, leading up the hierarchy to β(k), and then
to the formula α(p)(a)). Thus regardless of which of the discovered extralogical axioms
are selected for removal (status change) the desired property of the belief set will be
preserved.
This concludes the induction step and completes the proof by induction on t. 
Theorem 5.3. For any derivation path in an MIS, the belief set that results at the
conclusion of a process initiated by a user input will be consistent with respect to the
formulas of the forms α(k)(a), (∀x)(α(k)(x)→ β(p)(x)), and α(p)(a).
Proof. This adopts the approach presented in Theorem 7 for the DMA. LetB0, B1, . . .
and L0, L1, . . . be the belief sets and languages appearing in a derivation path for an
MIS. Define subsequences Bˆ0, Bˆ1, . . . and Lˆ0, Lˆ1, . . . by (i) Bˆ0 = B0 and Lˆ0 = L0, and (ii)
for u ≥ 0, where t is the time stamp for which Bˆu = Bt, Bˆu+1 and Lˆu+1 are the belief
set and language that result from application of the algorithm initiated by the user
input that produced Bt+1 from Bt. The theorem amounts to the statement that all the
Bˆu are consistent. By Proposition 15, every MIS is a normal DRS, so, by Proposition
13, it is sufficient to show that every Bˆu has a model, or more exactly, that there is an
interpretation I of Lˆu such that I |= Bˆu. This can be established by induction on u.
For the base step, with u = 0, we have Bˆu = Bu = ∅. Thus the set Γ of active formulas
in Bˆu is ∅. Any interpretation I of Lˆ0 = L0 is a model of ∅, by definition of model for
sets of formulas; i.e., all formulas in ∅ are valid in I by default. Thus any such I is a
model of Γ, which makes it a model of Bˆu by definition of model for belief sets.
For the induction step, with u ≥ 0, it is required to show for each of the four types
of user input, that, if there is an interpretation I of Lˆu such that I |= Bˆu, then I can
be transformed into an interpretation I∗ for Lˆu+1 such that I∗ |= Bˆu+1. In all cases, I∗
will agree with I on all predicate symbols and individual constant symbols of Lˆu.
Consider an input α(k)(a). This is an event of Type 1, which has four phases: (i) add
the input formula into the current belief set, (ii) scan the belief set for any formulas of
the form (∀x)(α(k)(x) → β(k)(x)) and apply Aristotelian Syllogism, (iii) scan the belief
set for any formulas of the form (∀x)(α(k)(x) → β(p)(x)) and apply Aristotelian Syllo-
gism, (iv) scan the belief set for any formulas of the form (∀x)(α(k)(x)→ ¬β(p)(x)) and
apply Aristotelian Syllogism. The latter three phases lead to further events, respec-
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tively, of Types 2, 3 and 4. We consider these four phases in order. Let t be such that
Bˆu = Bt. Then Lˆu = Lt.
Phase (i): The objective is to show that I can be expanded to an interpretation I ′ of
Lt+1 such that I ′ |= α(k)(a). If either α(k) or a is missing from Lt, then Lt+1 will be the
language obtained from Lt by adding the ones that are missing; otherwise Lt+1 = Lt.
Case 1: Neither are added. Let DI′ = DI and extend I to I ′ by setting I ′(α(k)) =
I(α(k)) ∪ {I(a)}, i.e., the relation designated by α(k) is expanded to include the object
designated by a. Case 2: α(k) is added, but a is not. Let DI′ = DI and extend I to I ′ by
assigning I ′(α(k)) = {I(a)}, i.e., I ′(α(k)) is a new unary relation on DI′ that holds only
for I(a). Case 3: a is added, but α(k) is not. Subcase 3.a: a is taken as representing a
new object d not in the domain DI (perhaps the most typical case). Let DI′ = DI ∪ {d},
assign I ′(a) = d, and let I ′(α(k)) = I(α(k))∪{d}. Subcase 3.b: a is taken as representing
a object d ∈ DI (this is atypical inasmuch as in an MIS one should not need more than
one representation for the same object). Let DI′ = DI and let I ′(α(k)) = I(α(k)) ∪ {d}.
Case 4: Both α(k) and a are added. Subcase 4.a: a is taken as representing a new
object d not in the domain DI (typical). Let DI′ = DI ∪ {d}, assign I ′(a) = d, and set
I ′(α(k)) = {d}. Subcase 4.b: a is taken as representing an object d ∈ DI (atypical).
Let DI′ = DI , assign I ′(a) = d, and set I ′(α(k)) = {d}. It follows in every case that
I ′ |= α(a). Note that Bt+1 = Bt ∪ {(α(k)(a), λ)}, where λ is the appropriate label. Since
I is a model of Bt, the foregoing makes I ′ a model of Bt+1.
Phase (ii): In this phase, Bt+1 is searched for active formulas of the form
(∀x)(α(k)(x)→ β(k)(x)), where α(k) is the predicate symbol of the input formula, and, if
found, Aristotelian Syllogism is applied to this and the input formula to infer β(k)(a),
which is provided to the controller. This constitutes an event of Type 2. Note that there
can be any number of such β(k), each leading to an event of Type 2. Thus it remains to
show that, if, at the beginning of an event of Type 2, the belief set has a model, then,
at the conclusion of the process initiated by that event, the resulting belief set has a
model. This is established below.
Phase (iii): Let B∗ be the most recent belief set, i.e., the one that resulted from the
above instances of Event Type 2. In this phase,B∗ is searched for active formulas of the
form (∀x)(α(k)(x) → β(p)(x)), where α(k) is the predicate symbol of the input formula,
and, if found, Aristotelian Syllogism is applied to this and the input formula to infer
β(p)(a), which is provided to the controller. This constitutes an event of Type 3. Note
that there can be any number of such β(p), each leading to an event of Type 3. Thus
it remains to show that, if, at the beginning of an event of Type 3, the belief set has
a model, then, at the conclusion of the process initiated by that event, the resulting
belief set has a model. This is established below.
Phase (iv): Let B∗∗ be the most recent belief set, i.e., the one that resulted from the
above instances of Event Type 2 and/or Type 3. In this phase, B∗∗ is searched for active
formulas of the form (∀x)(α(k)(x) → ¬β(p)(x)), where α(k) is the predicate symbol of
the input formula, and, if found, Aristotelian Syllogism is applied to this and the input
formula to infer ¬β(p)(a), which is provided to the controller. This constitutes an event
of Type 4. Note that there can be any number of such ¬β(p), each leading to an event
of Type 4. Thus it remains to show that, if, at the beginning of an event of Type 4, the
belief set has a model, then, at the conclusion of the process initiated by that event,
the resulting belief set has a model. This is established below.
Now observe that Bˆu+1 is the belief set that results from this process. Note also that
Lˆu+1 = Lt+1. Given the following verifications regarding events of Type 2, 3 and 4, the
foregoing shows that Lˆu+1 has an interpretation that is a model of Bˆu+1.
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Consider an event of Type 2, where a formula of the form α(k)(a) is provided to
the controller as the result of an inference rule application. This only occurs via an
application of Aristotelian Syllogism. The formula α(k)(a) is entered into the belief set.
Because no new symbols need to be added, Lˆu+1 = Lˆu. Let I be an interpretation of Lˆu
that models Bˆu. It is desired to show that I can be transformed into a model I ′ of the
belief set Bu+1 that results from the process associated with this event. This can be
established by the same considerations as above for Phase (i) of Event Type 1, except
that here only Case 1 applies. As with Event Type 1, an event of Type 2 can lead to
events of Type 3 and/or Type 4. These are considered next.
Consider an event of Type 3, where a formula of the form α(p)(a) is provided to
the controller as the result of an inference rule application. This only occurs via an
application of Aristotelian Syllogism. If the entry of this formula into the belief set
is not blocked in accordance with the specificity principle, and if it does not already
reside in the belief set, then the formula is entered into the belief set. Because no new
symbols need to be added, Lˆu+1 = Lˆu. Let I be an interpretation of Lˆu that models Bˆu.
It is desired to show that I can be transformed into a model I ′ of the belief set Bu+1
that results from the process associated with this event. This can be established by the
same considerations as above for Phase (i) of Event Type 1, Case 1, unless a scan of
the current belief set discovers an occurrence of ¬α(p)(a), leading to an event of Type
5. This event type is considered below.
Consider an event of Type 4, where a formula of the form ¬α(p)(a) is provided to
the controller as the result of an inference rule application. This only occurs via an
application of Aristotelian Syllogism. If the entry of this formula into the belief set
is not blocked in accordance with the specificity principle, and if it does not already
reside in the belief set, then the formula is entered into the belief set. Because no new
symbols need to be added, Lˆu+1 = Lˆu. Let I be an interpretation of Lˆu that models Bˆu.
It is desired to show that I can be transformed into a model I ′ of the belief set Bu+1
that results from the process associated with this event. This can be established by the
same considerations as above for Phase (i) of Event Type 1, Case 1, unless a scan of
the current belief set discovers an occurrence of α(p)(a), leading to an event of Type 5.
This event type is considered below.
Consider an event of Type 5, namely, providing ⊥ to the controller. This only occurs
via an application of Contradiction Detection. The formula ⊥ is entered into the belief
set, and this initiates an application of Dialectical Belief Revision. Let Bt be the belief
set that is current prior the occurrence of this event, and let I be an interpretation of
Lt that models Bt. It is desired to show that I can be transformed into a interpretation
I ′ of Lt that is a model of the belief set Bt′ that results from the Dialectical Belief
Revision process.
Let α(p)(a) and ¬α(p)(a) be the premises in the application of Contradiction De-
tection. The first phase of the Dialectical Belief Revision process employs from-lists
to backtrack through the derivations of these formulas, identifying all extralogical
axioms involved in their proofs. Note that neither of α(p)(a) and ¬α(p)(a) are ex-
tralogical axioms, but they will have been derived via Aristotelian Syllogism from
some formulas of the form β(k)(a) and (∀x)(β(k)(x) → α(p)(x)) (for the former) and
γ(k)(a) and (∀x)(γ(k)(x) → ¬α(p)(x)) (for the latter), where (∀x)(β(k)(x) → α(p)(x)) and
(∀x)(γ(k)(x) → ¬α(p)(x)) are extralogical axioms. Both of these are candidates for sta-
tus change.
Suppose that the status of (∀x)(β(k)(x) → α(p)(x)) is changed to disbel. Then by
forward chaining through to-lists Dialectical Belief Revision results in the status of
the derived formula α(p)(a) being changed to disbel, and then also the status of the
derived ⊥ being changed to disbel. There are two subcases. Subcase (i): The current
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instance of Event Type 5 arose as a result of this derivation, i.e., the formula ¬α(p)(a)
was already in the belief set. Note from the above that this belief set is Bt. Thus the
effect of Dialectical Belief Revision in this case is simply to disbelieve the formula that
was just entered, in which case one can let I ′ = I, i.e., the interpretation I is itself a
model of Bt′ . Subcase (ii): The current instance of Event Type 5 arose as a result of the
derivation of ¬α(p)(a) from some formulas δ(k)(a) and (∀x)(δ(k)(x) → ¬α(p)(x)). Then
Bt already contained the formula α(p)(a), so that I was such that I(a) ∈ I(α(p)). Let I ′
be obtained from I by setting I ′(α(p)) = I(α(p)) − {I(a)}, i.e., removing the object I(a)
from I(α(p)). Then I ′ |= Bt′ .
Suppose that the status of (∀x)(γ(k)(x) → ¬α(p)(x)) is changed to disbel. Then by
forward chaining through to-lists Dialectical Belief Revision results in the status of
the derived formula ¬α(p)(a) being changed to disbel, and then also the status of the
derived ⊥ being changed to disbel. Subcase (i): The current instance of Event Type 5
arose as a result of this derivation, i.e., the formula α(p)(a) was already in the belief
set. Note from the above that this belief set is Bt. Thus the effect of Dialectical Belief
Revision in this case is simply to disbelieve the formula that was just entered, in which
case one can let I ′ = I, i.e., the interpretation I itself is a model of Bt′ . Subcase (ii):
The current instance of Event Type 5 arose as a result of the derivation of α(p)(a)
from some formulas δ(k)(a) and (∀x)(δ(k)(x)→ α(p)(x)). Then Bt already contained the
formula ¬α(p)(a), so that I was such that I(a) /∈ I(α(p)). Let I ′ be obtained from I by
setting I ′(α(p)) = I(α(p)) ∪ {I(a)}, i.e., adding the object I(a) to I(α(p)). Then I ′ |= Bt′ .
If the status of neither (∀x)(β(k)(x) → α(p)(x)) nor (∀x)(γ(k)(x) → ¬α(p)(x)) is
changed to disbel, then Dialectical Belief Revision proceeds to explore the derivations
of β(k)(a) and γ(k)(a). We need only consider one of these; let us choose the former. This
formula could be an extralogical axiom. If so, then the contradiction could be removed
by changing the status of β(k)(a) to disbel and then forward chaining via its to-list to
change the status of α(p)(a) to disbel (and then on also to the input occurrence of ⊥).
Form I ′ from I by setting I ′(β(k)) = I(β(k)) − {I(a)} and I ′(α(p)) = I(α(p)) − {I(a)}.
Then I ′ |= Bt′ .
If β(k)(a) had not been input as an extralogical axiom, then it was derived by
an application of Aristotelian Syllogism. By continuing to backtrack in this man-
ner using from-lists, the process eventually finds all extralogical axioms involved
in the derivation of the current occurrence of ⊥. Some will be of the form α′(k)(a),
where a is the individual constant in the given β(k)(a), and some will be of the form
(∀x)(β′(k)(x) → γ′(k)(x)). One or more of these will have their belief status changed to
disbel, enough to ensure that the derivation of⊥ no longer applies. ThenBt′ is obtained
from Bt by making these changes in these formulas’ labels. Note incidentally that the
corresponding Bt′ will have been obtained by following the to-lists of all such formulas,
similarly changing the labels of all their consequences up to and including the trigger-
ing occurrence of ⊥. Let I ′ be obtained from I by setting I(α′′(k)) = I(α′′(k)) − {I(a)}
for every formula α′′(k)(a) whose label is changed to disbel in this second phase of the
Dialectical Belief Revision process. Then I ′ |= Bt′ .
The forgoing shows that, whichever of the available choices are made to resolve the
detected contradiction, there will be an interpretation I ′ of Lt that is a model of the
resulting belief set Bt′ .
Consider an input (∀x)(α(k)(x) → β(k)(x)). This is an event of Type 6. Let t be such
that Bˆu = Bt. Then Lˆu = Lt. Let I be an interpretation of Lˆu that models Bˆu. Then I is
an interpretation of Lt that models Bt. As prescribed by the event type’s description,
if α and β are already in Lt, the input is rejected if the input formula would create
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either a redundant path or a loop. Assuming that neither of these is the case, then
the process has two phases: (i) add the input formula into the belief set, (ii) scan the
belief set for any opportunities to apply Aristotelian syllogism, leading to invocations
of Event Type 2.
Phase (i): Here Bt+1 = Bt ∪{((∀x)(α(k)(x)→ β(k)(x)), λ)}, where λ is the appropriate
label. The objective is to show that I can be expanded to an interpretation I ′ of Lt+1
such that I ′ |= Bt+1. This amounts to showing that I can be expanded to an interpre-
tation I ′ of Lt+1 such that I ′ |= (∀x)(α(k)(x)→ β(k)(x)). If either α(k) or β(k) is missing
from Lt, then Lt+1 will be the language obtained from Lt by adding the ones that are
missing; otherwise Lt+1 = Lt. There are four cases depending on which symbols are
added. In all cases, set DI′ = DI . Case 1: Neither is added. Then α(k) and β(k) are
already in Lt. Form I ′ from I by setting I ′(β(k)) = I(β(k)) ∪ (I(α(k))− I(β(k))), i.e., add
to I(β(k)) the elements in I(α(k)) that are not already in I(β(k)). Note that this cannot
invalidate any expressions asserting that some of the newly added objects are not in
I(β(k)) since, by definition of the MIS controller, such assertions of nonmembership
cannot be entered into the belief set either by the user or via derivation from other
formulas in the belief set. Case 2: α(k) is added, but β(k) is not. Set I ′(α(k)) = ∅, i.e.,
introduce a new relation corresponding to α(k) and let it be the empty subset of I(β(k)).
Case 3: β(k) is added, but α(k) is not. Set I ′(β(k)) = I ′(α(k)), i.e., introduce a new rela-
tion corresponding to β(k) and make it coextensive with I(α(k)). Case 4: Both α(k) and
β(k) are added. Set I ′(α(k)) = I ′(β(k)) = ∅. It follows in every case that the formula
(∀x)(α(k)(x)→ β(k)(x)) will be true in I ′. Thus, in every case, I ′ |= Bt+1.
Phase (ii): The above Bt+1 is scanned for formulas of the form α(k)(a), where α(k)
is the predicate symbol of the input formula, and, if found, Aristotelian Syllogism is
applied, leading to an event of Type 2. That this results in a belief set with a model
was established in the foregoing.
Let Lˆu+1 andBˆu+1 be the language and belief set that results from the above process.
It follows that there is an interpretation I ′ of Lˆu+1 such that I ′ |= Bu+1.
Consider an input (∀x)(α(k)(x) → β(p)(x)). This is an event of Type 7, which may
lead to some occurrences of Event Type 3. The latter is discussed in the foregoing.
Consider an input (∀x)(α(k)(x) → ¬β(p)(x)). This is an event of Type 8, which may
lead to some occurrences of Event Type 4. The latter is discussed in the foregoing.
This concludes the induction step and completes the proof by induction on u. 
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